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> Context • Society is faced with “wicked” problems of environmental sustainability, which are inherently mul-
tiperspectival,  and  there  is  a  need  for  explicitly  constructivist  and  perspectivist  theories  to  address  them.   
> Problem • However, different constructivist theories construe the environment in different ways. The aim of 
this paper is to clarify the conceptions of environment in constructivist approaches, and thereby to assist the sci-
ences of complex systems and complex environmental problems. > Method • We describe the terms used for “the 
environment” in von Uexküll, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, and analyse how their conceptions of environ-
ment are connected to differences of perspective and observation. > Results • We show the need to distinguish 
between inside and outside perspectives on the environment, and identify two very different and complementary 
logics of observation, the logic of distinction and the logic of representation, in the three constructivist theories.   
> Implications  •  Luhmann’s  theory  of  social  systems  can  be  a  helpful  perspective  on  the  wicked  environmen-
tal problems of society if we consider carefully the theory’s own blind spots: that it confines itself to systems of 
communication, and that it is based fully on the conception of observation as indication by means of distinction.   
> Key words • Umwelt, world, phenomenology, biosemiotics, autopoiesis, perspectivism, Peirce.
1 Introduction
« 1 »  Environments are pivotal to mod-
ern societies. As Niklas Luhmann wrote in 
Ecological  communication:  “Contemporary 
society feels itself affected in many different 
ways by the changes that it has produced in 
its own environment” (Luhmann 1989: 1), 
referring  to  consumption  of  non-replace-
able  resources,  biodiversity  loss,  pathogen 
resistance,  pollution,  and  over-population 
(and today we would add climate change to 
that list). Modern society not only changes 
its own environment – it compromises the 
quality of human life and undermines the 
conditions for its own continued existence. 
Since Gro Harlem Brundtland (1987), this 
problematic has been high on the political 
and  scientific  agenda.  It  is  generally  dis-
cussed  within  the  framework  of  environ-
mental sustainability, based on ideas such as 
sustained yield in forestry, ecosystem carry-
ing capacity in ecology, and natural capital 
in economics, generalised to the consider-
ation of global life support systems (Good-
land 1995).
« 2 »  The  problems  of  environmen-
tal sustainability are “wicked problems” in 
the  sense  of  Horst  Rittel  &  Melvin  Web-
ber (1973). Wicked problems are complex, 
unique,  dynamic  problems  that  are  never 
really solved. Different individuals and or-
ganisations disagree on what the problem is 
because they have different values and inter-
ests with regard to it and different perspec-
tives on it. They therefore frame and formu-
late the problem differently. Bryan Norton 
emphasises:
“  For those frustrated with the lack of progress in 
many areas of environmental protection, Rittel & 
Webber’s work suggested a powerful explanatory 
hypothesis:  Complex  environmental  problems 
cannot be comprehended within any of the ac-
cepted disciplinary models available in academy 
or in discourses on public interest and policy. This 
failure is not a matter of inadequate practice, but a 
matter of principle.” (Norton 2012: 449)
« 3 »  With respect to wicked problems, 
we face an analytic void, Norton continues, 
and future analyses of complex environmen-
tal problems must be highly contextual.
« 4 »  In other words, complex environ-
mental  problems  are  inherently  multiper-
spectival.  Each  scientific  and  stakeholder 
perspective  constructs  its  own  immediate 
problem,  which  is  but  one  aspect  of  the 
“really  efficient”  dynamic  problem.  Such 
complex problems therefore require trans-
disciplinary  research  cooperation  that  in-
corporates the dependence on context and 
perspective into an explicitly constructivist 
and  perspectivist  framework  (cf.  Alrøe  & 
Noe 2011).
« 5 »  However, the issue we want to ad-
dress here is not on the level of different 
perspectives on environmental problems, 
but  on  the  deeper  foundational  level  of 
how  “environment”  is  construed  in  dif-
ferent approaches to such problems. More 
specifically, we are interested in the con-
struction of “the environment” in different 
constructivist approaches.
« 6 »  The  basic  tenet  of  constructiv-
ism is the essential observer-dependency 
of  observations  and  knowledge  (as  evi-
dent  in  Humberto  Maturana’s  statement 
that “anything said is said by an observer” 
and  Heinz  von  Foerster’s  basic  idea  that 
observers are necessarily involved in their 
observations  and  not  neutral  or  outside, 
cf.  Schmidt  2010).  All  constructivist  ap-
proaches  therefore  share  the  intricate 
problem of the relation between observer 
and world – or system and environment. 
And any universal constructivist approach 
(sensu Luhmann 1995: 15) must be able to 
observe itself and its construction of “the 
environment.”
« 7 »  In this paper, we will thus turn 
constructivism  on  itself,  observing  the 
concept  of  environment  in  some  impor-
tant roots and proponents of constructiv-
ism.  In  particular,  we  will  look  at  Jakob 
von Uexküll’s biosemiotic theory of mean-
ing,  Humberto  Maturana  and  Francisco 
Varela’s  biological  theory  of  autopoiesis 
and cognition, and Luhmann’s autopoietic 
theory of social systems.
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« 8 »  The three theories in focus are all 
constructivist in the sense that they take ob-
server-dependency as a basic precondition. 
However, we have been elaborating a con-
structivist and perspectivist framework for 
research in complex agroecological systems 
and problems of environmental sustainabil-
ity, based on these and related theories,1 and 
through this work it has become clear to us 
that they contradict each other in important 
and quite fundamental ways. In particular, 
they have, as we shall see in the following, 
different  conceptions  of  “environment,” 
which  are  related  to  their  conceptions  of 
“observation” and “system.”
« 9 »  The aim of the paper is thus two-
fold: to clarify the concepts of environment 
in different constructivist approaches, and 
thereby to assist the sciences of complex sys-
tems and complex environmental problems.
« 10 »  to meet this aim, we shall first 
describe how we go about observing envi-
ronments, keeping track of different termi-
nologies and perspectives, and give an over-
view of the concepts of environment (and 
related concepts) in von Uexküll, Maturana 
& Varela, and Luhmann, based on their own 
descriptions. on this basis, we then discuss 
the possible deeper conceptual differences 
in their conceptions of environment, focus-
sing on differences that are important in re-
1 |  This  framework  combines  autopoietic, 
cognitive,  and  semiotic  theories  (in  line  with 
Brier 2008) to model science as a cognitive sys-
tem to complement the communicational aspects 
of science as a learning system (Alrøe 2000). This 
model  is  used  to  illuminate  the  inside/outside 
positions  in  research  methodology,  and  to  ad-
dress the problems of handling values in science 
through reflexive objectivity (Alrøe & Kristensen 
2002).  In  environmental  ethics,  the  framework 
is  used  to  elaborate  a  second-order  cybernetic 
model of moral acting that establishes an ethi-
cal basis for sustainability and the precautionary 
principle from environmental politics (Alrøe & 
Kristensen  2003).  In  a  later,  fully  perspectivist 
form, the framework is used to resolve the para-
dox of scientific expertise: that the growth of sci-
ence leads to a fragmentation of scientific exper-
tise. It also used to handle the ensuing problems 
of cross-disciplinary cooperation by exposing the 
perspectival structure of knowledge and science 
and introducing second-order perspectives (Al-
røe & Noe 2011).
lation to the foundation of constructivism 
and perspectivism. Finally, we draw some 
conclusions with regard to the application 
of constructivist theories on complex envi-
ronmental problems.
2. Observing 
“the environment” 
in von uexküll, Maturana 
& varela, and luhmann
2.1. How to observe environments
« 11 »  In  this  section,  we  will  give  an 
overview  of  the  concepts  of  environment 
and related concepts in von Uexküll, Mat-
urana  &  Varela,  and  Luhmann,  based  on 
their  own  descriptions.  But  first  we  shall 
give a brief description of how we go about 
observing these environments.
« 12 »  If you accept observer-dependen-
cy as a built-in precondition for scientific 
cognition and communication, you will be 
prepared for certain difficulties in observing 
the concepts of “environment” in different 
scientific  approaches.  The  methodological 
challenge has three layers:
1  |  the problems of different terminology 
(that the different approaches use differ-
ent terms for “environment” and hold 
different meanings of the same terms),
2  |  the  connection  of  the  terminological 
differences to deeper differences in per-
spective, and
3  |  our need to clarify our own analytical 
perspective and make clear what con-
cepts of observation and environment 
are used in the analyses and compari-
sons  in  order  to  discuss  these  differ-
ences.
« 13 »  These  methodological  problems 
are no different from those encountered in 
other interdisciplinary work, but with the 
added twist that the research object is (also) 
the very concept of “a research object,” since 
this (the research object) is a key aspect of 
the environment of a scientific system.
« 14 »  As we have indicated, we will ad-
dress  this  convoluted  issue  of  observing 
environments  by  way  of  a  perspectivist 
approach  (cf.  Alrøe  and  Noe  2011).  This 
means that we will not only be looking at 
terminology in the form of different terms 
for “environment” and different meanings 
of the same terms, but also at the deeper dif-
ferences in perspective that the terminolog-
ical differences are connected to. We look 
at  the  differences  in  perspective  in  terms 
of elements such as domain and interests, 
type of examples, type of logic and model, 
and concepts and theories. With regard to 
our own analytical perspective, it builds on 
the very constructivist approaches that are 
scrutinized here, as well as other sources. In 
particular, our approach builds on Charles 
Sanders  Peirce’s  theory  of  semiotics,  and 
we shall utilize this comprehensive theory 
of meaning and representation in the criti-
cal analysis of the three constructivist ap-
proaches. This work will thus also have the 
added bonus that it will enable us to take a 
critical look at the perspectivist approach it-
self and the concepts of “observation,” “sys-
tem,” and “environment” that are employed 
here.
« 15 »  In  accordance  with  this  back-
ground, we will look first at von Uexküll’s 
conception  of  environment,  which  was 
strongly influenced by the prominent Kan-
tian philosophy of understanding that also 
influenced Peirce’s semiotics. This philoso-
phy,  with  its  Copernican  turn  from  “our 
cognition must conform to the objects” to 
“the objects must conform to our cognition” 
(Kant 1998: B xvi), is in many ways funda-
mental to constructivism (Glasersfeld 1995: 
39) and an important root of perspectivism 
(Palmquist 1993). Von Uexküll’s concept of 
environment, Umwelt, is now being wide-
ly used and debated, and this will help us 
elaborate a firm basis for the analyses. Fur-
thermore, von Uexküll’s work predates that 
of Maturana & Varela and Luhmann, and by 
proceeding in chronological order we will 
be better able to discuss how the approaches 
compare and differ.
2.2. von uexküll’s umwelt
« 16 »  Von Uexküll considered himself 
Kantian  in  orientation,  and  he  explicitly 
referred to Kant as a starting point for his 
work  in  biology.  All  reality  is  subjective 
appearance, he states, describing the solid 
ground that Kant prepared to support the 
edifice of the natural sciences. Kant placed 
the subject called man in opposition to its 
objects,  and  outlined  the  basic  principles 
according to which objects are formed in 
our mind:41
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“  The task of biology is to expand the result of 
Kant’s research along two lines: (1) to consider 
the role of our body, particularly our perceptual 
organs and the central nervous system and (2) to 
study the relationship of other subjects (animals) 
to their objects.” (Uexküll 1973: 9f; translation 
from Thure von Uexküll 1992: 287)
« 17 »  Uexküll  elaborated  on  this  task 
for the better part of his life, developing a 
theory of signs and meaning for the study 
of  animal  behaviour:  “Behaviors  are  not 
mere movements or tropisms, but they con-
sist of perception (Merken) and operation 
(Wirken); they are not mechanically regu-
lated, but meaningfully organized.” (Uexküll 
1982:  26).  In  the  course  of  this  work  he 
made important independent contributions, 
especially to the fields of (bio)semiotics and 
ethology,  and  also  had  some  influence  in 
philosophy, especially on theories of episte-
mology (e.g., Kull 1999, 2001; Harré 1990; 
Buchanan 2008; Stjernfelt 2011).
« 18 »  From 1909, with the publication 
of Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, through 
to the end of his life in 1944, von Uexküll 
focused his research on attempting to dis-
cern and give expression to what he called 
the Umwelten of animals, and which he al-
ternately described as “phenomenal worlds,” 
“self-worlds,”  and  “subjective  universes” 
(Buchanan 2008: 18).2
« 19 »  “Each Umwelt forms a closed unit 
in itself, which is governed, in all its parts, by 
the meaning it has for the subject” (Uexküll 
1982: 30) and “there are as many worlds as 
there are subjects” (Uexküll 1973: 70). For 
example, the stem of a blooming meadow 
2 |  The  term  Umwelt  was  invented  by  the 
Danish poet Jens Immanuel Baggesen in a Ger-
man poem in 1800 (due to the necessities of the 
Homeric  hexameter  metric),  and  used  thereon 
in both Germany (Umwelt) and Denmark (om-
verden).  In  Germany,  it  was  originally  used  in 
the sense of ‘surroundings;’ after Uexküll, it came 
to be used mainly in his sense of ‘the phenom-
enal world;’ and since the 1970s the predominant 
meaning is that of ‘the environment’ in the sense 
of  the  environmental  movement.  Interestingly, 
‘Umwelt’ has today been taken up in English lan-
guage as a technical term within biosemiotics and 
related fields, in Uexküll’s sense, though it is also 
employed in the two other senses. (Sutrop 2001, 
Chien 2007)
flower can be a foot path to food in the Um-
welt of an ant, an extraction point for watery 
sap to feed on and construct a protective cell 
in the Umwelt of a cicada larva, a morsel of 
fodder in the Umwelt of a cow, and a means 
of bodily ornamentation in a girl’s Umwelt 
(Uexküll 1982: 29f).
« 20 »  Von Uexküll uses different meta-
phors to convey how he understands these 
diverse animal (and human) environments. 
For instance, to glimpse the environments 
of the dwellers of a meadow, he envisages 
how we can blow, in fancy, a soap bubble 
around each creature to represent its own 
world,  filled  with  the  perceptions  that  it 
alone knows:
“  When we ourselves then step into one of these 
bubbles,  the  familiar  meadow  is  transformed. 
Many of its colorful features disappear; others no 
longer belong together but appear in new relation-
ships. A new world comes into being. Through the 
bubble we see the environment of the burrowing 
worm, of the butterfly, or of the field mouse; the 
world  as  it  appears  to  the  animals  themselves, 
not as it appears to us. This we may call the phe-
nomenal world or the self-world of the animal.” 
(Uexküll 1992: 319)
« 21 »  There are two important aspects 
of the concept of Umwelten here: that they 
are  phenomenal  worlds  and  that  they  are 
meaningful.  Every  animal,  von  Uexküll 
claims, is surrounded by a world in which 
the environment is perceived and known to 
this animal alone, and that may very well be 
invisible to other animals or humans. The 
soap bubble constitutes the limit of the ani-
mal’s world, inside which things are signifi-
cant and meaningful, and what lies beyond 
is hidden (Buchanan 2008: 23). Therefore we 
cannot easily understand the environment 
of other living organisms, be they animal or 
human. Von Uexküll presents the striking 
example of the female tick (Ixodes ricinus), 
which is blind and deaf. It has a very simple 
Umwelt consisting of sunrays, directing her 
up to the tip of a twig by the photosensitivity 
of her skin; the odour of butyric acid from 
mammal skin glands, which signals her to 
drop down; and a fine sense of temperature 
that leads her to the skin of the warm-blood-
ed animal where she burrows deep in. “The 
external world (Welt) is as good as nonexis-
tent, as are the general surroundings (Umge-
bung) of the organism. Both are theoretical 
references to contrast with the meaningful 
world of the Umwelt.” (Buchanan 2008: 24)
« 22 »  The precondition for there being 
limits for an organism to go beyond its own 
phenomenal world and enter into the Um-
welten of other living organisms, is thus that 
the Umwelt is meaningful to the organism 
itself. Behaviour is not a mechanical process 
and animals are not “mere machines” [blosse 
objekte], but subjects whose essential activ-
ity consists of perceiving and acting:
“  We  thus  unlock  the  gates  that  lead  to  other 
realms, for all that a subject perceives becomes his 
perceptual world [Merkwelt] and all that he does 
becomes his effector world [Wirkwelt]. Perceptual 
and effector worlds together form a closed unit, 
the Umwelt.” (Uexküll 1992: 320.)
« 23 »  In  accordance  with  this,  von 
Uexküll characterised his own approach to 
biology as “The theory of meaning” (Uexküll 
1982), and came to be considered the found-
ing father of biosemiotics (Sebeok 2001).
« 24 »  Another pervasive metaphor that 
von Uexküll uses to express his theory of 
meaning is music: “The musical reference 
… is crucial to understanding how he inter-
prets organisms as “tones” that resonate and 
harmonize  with  other  things,  both  living 
and non-living.” (Buchanan 2008: 8). For in-
stance, he describes how an object can have 
different tones or qualities because an object 
in relation to a subject is a “meaning-carri-
er,” and the object has different meanings in 
different contexts (Uexküll 1982: 27).
2.3. Maturana & varela’s 
autopoietic living systems
« 25 »  Maturana & Varela’s work can be 
characterised as “biology of cognition,” and 
they are most widely known for their theory 
of autopoiesis as a fundamental characteris-
tic of living systems. They define an autopoi-
etic unity as
“  a network of processes of production, transfor-
mation and destruction of components that pro-
duces the components which: (i) through their 
interactions and transformations regenerate and 
realize the network of processes (relations) that 
produced them, and (ii) constitute it as a concrete 
unity in the space in which they (the components) 
exist.” (Maturana & Varela 1980: 79)E
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In other words,
“  one way to spotlight the specificity of autopoi-
esis is to think of it self-referentially as that or-
ganization which maintains the very organization 
itself as an invariant.” (Varela 1991: 84)
« 26 »  The focus on the autopoiesis and 
cognition of living systems in Maturana & 
Varela  means  that  their  concepts  of  envi-
ronment are not as prominent and elabo-
rated as von Uexküll’s. They are, however, 
in many ways congruent with von Uexküll. 
In  describing  how  their  strand  of  biology 
of cognition is different from other strands, 
they “propose a way of seeing cognition not 
as a representation of the world ‘out there,’ 
but rather as an ongoing bringing forth of 
a world through the process of living itself” 
(Maturana & Varela 1998: 11). A key point, 
which  is  in  line  with  von  Uexküll,  is  the 
connection between action and experience: 
“this inseparability between a particular way 
of being and the way the world appears to 
us, tells us that every act of knowing brings 
forth a world” (ibid: 26).
« 27 »  The paradoxicality of autopoiesis 
is that the living system must distinguish it-
self from its environment while at the same 
time maintaining its coupling, since it is this 
very environment that the organism arises 
from (Varela 1991: 85). In defining what it 
is as a unity, the organism at the same time 
defines what remains exterior to it, that is, its 
surrounding environment:
“  … this exteriorization can only be understood, 
so to speak, from the ‘inside’: the autopoietic uni-
ty creates a perspective from which the exterior is 
one which cannot be confused with the physical 
surroundings as they appear to us as observers.” 
(Varela 1991: 85)
« 28 »  The recognition of the importance 
of  interpretation  and  significance  as  seen 
from the point of view of the living system 
is similar to von Uexküll’s theory of mean-
ing (though Maturana & Varela apparently 
did not know of his work). And it leads to a 
clearly perspectivist distinction that is stated 
as a key point that may seem obvious, but 
that has deep ramifications:
“  I mean the important distinction between the 
environment of the living system as it appears to 
an observer and without reference to the autono-
mous unity – which we shall call hereafter simply 
the environment – and the environment for the 
system which is defined in the same movement 
that gave rise to its identity and that only exists in 
that mutual definition – hereinafter the system’s 
world.” (Varela 1991: 85)
« 29 »  In other words, the situatedness of 
a cognitive entity means that it has – by defi-
nition – a perspective, and that it relates to 
its environment in relation to the perspec-
tive established by the agent itself (Varela 
1991: 99).
« 30 »  The  concept  of  environment  is 
discussed  by  Maturana  &  Varela  in  rela-
tion to the two-way fit between organism 
and environment. This is what they refer to 
as a structural congruence between organ-
ism and environment, which is the result of 
structural coupling:
“  In these interactions, the structure of the en-
vironment only triggers structural changes in the 
autopoietic unities (it does not specify or direct 
them), and vice versa for the environment. The 
result will be a history of mutual congruent struc-
tural changes as long as the autopoietic unity and 
its containing environment do not disintegrate: 
there will be a structural coupling.” (Maturana 
& Varela 1998: 74f)
« 31 »  This also means that two or more 
autopoietic  units  can  undergo  coupled 
structural changes when their interactions 
take on a recurrent or more stable nature, 
without losing their internal organization.
« 32 »  In  a  separate  publication,  Mat-
urana  makes  a  more  elaborate  distinction 
between medium, niche, and environment 
from the viewpoint of an outside observer:
“  The basic operation that an observer performs 
in the praxis of living is the operation of distinc-
tion. In the operation of distinction an observer 
brings forth a unity (an entity, a whole) as well as 
the medium in which it is distinguished.” (Mat-
urana 1988: 6, viii)
« 33 »  The medium of a unity is the con-
taining background of distinctions with re-
spect to which an observer distinguishes it. 
The medium includes both what Maturana 
calls the environment of a unity – that part 
of the background that is distinguished by 
the observer as surrounding the unity – and 
what he calls the niche of a unity – that part 
of the background that the observer con-
ceives as interacting with the unity, and to 
which it is structurally coupled: “… a unity 
continuously realizes and specifies its niche 
by actually operating in its domain of per-
turbations  while  conserving  adaptation  in 
the medium.” (Maturana 1988: 6, xiii)
« 34 »  In  other  words,  the  niche  does 
not exist independently of the unity, and it 
changes as the domain of interactions of the 
unity changes.
« 35 »  That  is  to  say,  for  an  observer, 
the unity is distinguished from its medium, 
which can be separated into its niche, with 
which it interacts and couples, and its envi-
ronment, which (merely) surrounds it.
2.4. luhmann’s autopoietic social 
systems
« 36 »  Luhmann  devoted  his  life  to 
building a unified theory of modern society 
based on systems theory and the German 
tradition  of  social  philosophy  from  Kant 
onwards. As for von Uexküll, the concept 
of meaning was central for Luhmann, who 
drew especially on the phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl3, and he considered mean-
ing the basic concept of the social sciences 
(Luhmann 2006, 1990: 21ff).
« 37 »  Luhmann  distinguished  four 
types of systems: machines, organisms, so-
cial systems, and psychic systems, of which 
only the latter two are characterised by their 
use of meaning (Luhmann 1995: 2–3). This 
is in sharp contrast to von Uexküll, for whom 
meaning was a key biological concept. Con-
sequently Luhmann considers only psychic 
and,  predominantly,  social  systems.  These 
have evolved together, and at any time the 
3 |  It  would  be  interesting  and  relevant  to 
take a deeper look at Luhmann’s Husserlian per-
ception of phenomenological method, and how 
this  relates  to  the  concept  of  environment,  but 
that would take us too far astray for this paper. 
Here we will only note that Peirce regarded Hus-
serl’s (early) work as psychologistic in character in 
spite of Husserl’s claim to the contrary; yet Peirce 
considered  his  own  early  work  on  categories  a 
foundational work in phenomenology (Ransdell 
1997). See also Søren Brier (2009) on the relation 
between  Husserlian  and  Peircean  phenomenol-
ogy and constructivism.43
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one  is  the  necessary  environment  for  the 
other (Luhmann 1995: 59). For psychic and 
social systems, meaning becomes the form 
of the world and consequently overlaps the 
difference  between  system  and  environ-
ment:
“  Even the environment is given to them in the 
form of meaning, and their boundaries with the 
environment are boundaries constituted in mean-
ing, thus referring within as well as without.” 
(Luhmann 1995: 61)
Society is not composed of human be-
ings, but persons cannot exist without social 
systems, nor social systems without persons.
« 38 »  The basic aspect of social systems 
for  Luhmann  is  communication.  Social 
systems  are  communicative  systems,  and 
Luhmann took the fundamental process of 
Maturana & Varela’s autopoiesis – the sys-
tem’s reproduction of its basic elements to 
preserve its own organisation – and applied 
it to social systems in the form of self-pro-
duction  of  the  communicative  elements. 
Therefore, ecosystems are not systems ac-
cording to Luhmann. Luhmann states that 
the usage of the concept of system in this 
way, as in the normal use of “ecosystem,” 
produces considerable confusion. Based on 
the theory of social systems, not every in-
terconnection is a system. A system exists 
only when an interconnection distinguish-
es itself from an environment. In this sys-
tems theoretical sense, the environment is 
not a system in itself, but something that is 
constituted by social systems that differen-
tiate and define their own boundaries: “The 
‘unity’ of the environment is nothing more 
than a correlate of the unity of the system 
since everything that is a unity for the sys-
tem is defined by it as a unity” (Luhmann 
1989: 6).
« 39 »  The  consequences  of  this  inter-
pretation can be reduced to two points: (1) 
Society as a system is not seen as a smaller 
unity within a larger one (the world), but as 
the difference of the system of society and 
environment (cf. Luhmann 1989: 6), (2) The 
idea of system elements must be changed 
from substances or individuals to self-ref-
erential operations of communication that 
can be produced only within the system and 
with the help of a network of the same op-
erations (autopoiesis).
“  If these two points are accepted then ‘society’ 
signifies  the  all  -encompassing  social  system  of 
mutually referring communications. It originates 
through communicative acts alone and differen-
tiates itself from an environment of other kinds 
of systems through the continual reproduction of 
communication by communication. In this way 
complexity  is  constituted  through  evolution.” 
(Luhmann 1989: 7)
« 40 »  According to Luhmann, there is 
no  environment  in  itself.  It  exists  only  in 
relation to something else, like a system as 
seen by an outside observer or from an ob-
serving system that distinguishes itself from 
its environment (Krause 2005: 250).
“  All observation of the environment presumes 
the  distinction  of  self-reference  and  other-ref-
erence, which can only be made in the system 
itself (where else?)” (Luhmann 1997: 92, own 
translation)4
3. Perspectives 
on the environment
3.1. Fields of observation
« 41 »  It  seems  clear  from  the  above 
observations of the “environments” of von 
Uexküll, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, 
that  they  are  different  in  several  ways.  In 
this section we will summarize how they are 
different and analyse what is behind the ob-
served differences.
« 42 »  As described above, an important 
(though  rather  banal)  difference  between 
these three approaches is that they are not 
concerned with the same thing, their focus 
or field of observation is quite different. Von 
Uexküll focuses on behavioral biology and 
how behaviour is linked to the sense and 
effector organs of the organism. Maturana 
& Varela share the focus on biology, living 
organisms,  and  their  cognition.  But  their 
emphasis  is  on  neurophysiology  and  not 
ethology. to understand the importance of 
this difference, it is telling that whereas von 
Uexküll founded the “Institut für Umwelt-
4 |  “Alle  Umweltbeobachtung  setzt  die  Un-
terscheidung von Selbstreferenz und Fremdrefe-
renz voraus, die nur im System selbst (wo denn 
sonst?) getroffen werden kann.”
forschung” (at the University of Hamburg), 
Maturana, for most of his life, ran a research 
centre  on  the  “Biology  of  Knowledge”  (at 
the University of Chile). In other words, von 
Uexküll  looked  mainly  at  animal  worlds, 
how they differ, and how they are construct-
ed, while Maturana & Varela looked at the 
organism itself, the nature of life, and the 
biology of cognition.
« 43 »  Luhmann, in contrast to the two 
others,  focuses  almost  entirely  on  social 
systems, as one form of autopoietic system, 
which he distinguishes from the living sys-
tems of Maturana & Varela and from psy-
chic systems of consciousness and thought. 
For  Luhmann,  social  systems  are  strictly 
communicative  systems,  defining  commu-
nication as the unity of the selection of in-
formation, message, and understanding.
« 44 »  These differences in domain are 
important in understanding the deeper dif-
ferences, and we will return to them in the 
following analyses.
3.2. terminology of the environment
« 45 »  Before we can analyse any deeper 
conceptual differences, however, we need to 
look at the immediate terminological differ-
ences. The three theories treated in this pa-
per use different terms for the environment, 
though  they,  and  their  commentators,  are 
not always entirely consistent in their usage. 
Some of the terms are also used in general 
language, but often in different senses, and 
there are also difficulties in translating the 
terms.
« 46 »  In  this  section,  we  will  try  to 
clarify the terminology in order to make the 
deeper  conceptual  similarities  and  differ-
ences clearer. We shall briefly discuss what 
might be better and worse terms – realizing 
that the usage of terms is something that is 
decided in the community of scholars and 
stakeholders  –  and  determine  the  termi-
nology to be used in the remainder of the 
paper. Since von Uexküll’s concepts are the 
most elaborate and debated, we will, again, 
start here.
« 47 »  The  terms  “phenomenal  world,” 
“self-world,”  “subjective  universe,”  “sub-
jective  world,”  and  “semiotic  world”  have 
all  been  suggested  as  translations  of  von 
Uexküll’s concept of Umwelt (Sutrop 2001). 
others  prefer  “environmental  world”  or 
simply “environment” (Buchanan 2008).E
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« 48 »  The terms “subjective world” and 
“subjective  universe”  situate  themselves  in 
the context of the subjective-objective dis-
tinction, which can be misleading because 
the  Umwelt,  as  a  Kantian  and  semiotic 
concept,  transcends  that  very  distinction. 
to underline this point, the opposite term 
“objective world” is in fact used by Deely 
(2001) and others as a translation for von 
Uexküll’s Umwelt, and this term will be even 
more prone to misunderstanding. Drawing 
on von Uexküll’s soap bubble metaphor for 
Umwelt, we might use the term “subworld,” 
which has been used in somewhat similar 
meanings in artificial intelligence (e.g., Nie-
renburg & Rasking 1987) and ethnography 
(e.g., Crosset and Beal 1997), but not, to our 
knowledge,  within  biosemiotics.  The  term 
“self-world” can lead the reader in the di-
rection of the concept of Eigenwelt, or own-
world, in existential psychotherapy. That is, 
the mode of relationship to one’s self as one 
mode of world, in contrast to the world of 
fellows and the world around (May 1958).
« 49 »  This  leaves  the  term  “phenom-
enal world” as the better alternative of the 
suggested translations of Umwelt, and one 
that corresponds well with Peircean semiot-
ics and its Kantian roots.
« 50 »  Probably due to the difficulty of 
translating  Umwelt,  some  advocate  main-
taining the German term Umwelt as a tech-
nical term in English, in the philosophical 
meaning  of  “phenomenal  world”  (Sutrop 
2001).  This  usage  of  Umwelt  is  well-es-
tablished  in  the  scholarly  community  of 
biosemiotics, and it has also been used in 
psychology  as  “the  technical  term  for  the 
subjectively meaningful surroundings of an 
individual  group”  (Graumann  1983:  647). 
But outside these communities, this use of 
Umwelt  in  English  is,  in  our  experience, 
prone to lack of understanding, misunder-
standing,  and  confusion  with  the  current 
usage of Umwelt in German. Moreover, the 
term Umwelt is also used in other meanings 
than the von Uexküllian in English (Sutrop 
2001).
« 51 »  Uexküll  himself  experienced 
similar problems in describing the relations 
between an animal and its Aussenwelt (ex-
ternal  world),  He  distinguished  between 
Umwelt  and  three  other  concepts  (Sutrop 
2001: 453): Umgebung (surroundings) is the 
area in nature where an animal can be ob-
served; Wohnwelt (environment) is the sum 
of ecological factors that enables an animal 
to live in its Umgebung; Umwelt means that 
every animal has its own world with only 
such  objects  that  are  significant  for  that 
animal; Milieu refers to the external world 
in the sense that living subjects are formed 
by  the  world  they  live  in.  “Unfortunately, 
Uexküll  writes,  Umwelt  is  often  used  for 
Umgebung, Wohnwelt, and milieu as well” 
(Sutrop 2001: 453).
« 52 »  Directly  following  the  usage  of 
von Uexküll, we could still use his concepts 
in  German  (and  Danish),  Umwelt  (om-
verden)  and  Umgebung  (omgivelser).  The 
problem with that is that, at least in German, 
the term Umwelt is today used generally in 
connections with environmental problems, 
etc., whereas the more philosophical phe-
nomenological  understanding  of  the  term 
in the tradition of von Uexküll is obsolete, 
according to Sutrop (2001) (but note Luh-
mann’s use of Umwelt). In Danish, the gen-
eral term used in connection with environ-
mental problems is “miljø,” corresponding 
to  the  french  “milieu,”  and  “omverden”  is 
used von Uexküll’s sense, but also in other 
senses.
« 53 »  In  English,  following  von 
Uexküll’s  German  terms  Umwelt  and 
Umgebung, we could be tempted to use the 
common  words  “environment”  and  “sur-
roundings”  for  these  two  concepts,  bear-
ing in mind that they are not used in their 
common, rather vague meaning, but in the 
more precise meaning indicated above. The 
strength of these everyday words is that they 
are  understood  by  all;  the  weakness  that 
they will often not be understood with the 
meaning intended.
« 54 »  Moreover, as we have seen above, 
this usage of environment is exactly opposite 
that of Maturana & Varela, where “environ-
ment” is used in roughly the sense of Umge-
bung, and “world” in the sense of Umwelt.
« 55 »  Luhmann  only  uses  only  one 
term, Umwelt (which is consistently trans-
lated as environment), to indicate either the 
system’s  own  distinction  of  itself  from  its 
environment  or  an  outside  observer’s  dis-
tinction of the system from its environment 
(Krause 2005: 250).
« 56 »  Summing  up,  we  will,  for  sake 
of  clarity,  use  the  slightly  cumbersome 
term phenomenal world in the sense of von 
Uexküll’s Umwelt and the term surrounding 
world in the sense of Umgebung in the re-
mainder of the paper. These terms have the 
benefit  of  being  generally  understandable 
and not as prone to misunderstanding as the 
common term “environment.”
3.3. Point of view 
on the environment
« 57 »  Having looked at the differences 
in terms of their field of observation and the 
terms used to describe the environment, we 
will  now  go  into  some  deeper  differences 
related to how they construe their perspec-
tives on environment in terms of the point 
of  view,  or  observational  position,  from 
where the environment is observed.
« 58 »  The constructivist postulate is that 
“the environment as we perceive it is our in-
vention” (Foerster 2003: 212). As we have 
seen above, Maturana & Varela very clearly 
distinguish between the phenomenal world, 
the environment for the living system,5 and 
the environment of the living system as it ap-
pears to an observer. They consider the shift-
ing between inside and outside perspectives 
a cornerstone of biology and the awareness 
of these shifts a key to understanding the na-
ture of the relationship between autopoietic 
autonomous unities and their environment 
(Varela 1991: 85). Von Uexküll also worked 
with the system of signs of the human ob-
server in opposition to the system of signs 
of the organism under observation (Uexküll 
t. 1992).
« 59 »  We consider this distinction be-
tween inside and outside perspectives to be 
a basic premise of perspectivism (Alrøe & 
Noe 2011; Alrøe 2000). A similar distinction 
has been widely used in anthropology and 
other  fields  (where  the  distinction  is  piv-
otal to adequate understanding) under the 
somewhat odd names “emic” (inside) and 
“etic”  (outside)  viewpoints,  from  the  lin-
guistic  distinction  between  phonemic  and 
phonetic (Headland et al. 1990).
« 60 »  Luhmann also very clearly oper-
ates with a perspectivist approach (though 
he does not call it that), laying out prem-
ises of observation of observation following 
Maturana & Varela and von Foerster’s (1980, 
5 |  of course ticks and other animals do not 
speak of their world, so the inside perspective of 
animals is that envisaged by an observer.45
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2003) second-order cybernetics. In a strik-
ing formulation, he says that “… a system 
can only see what it can see. It cannot see 
what it cannot. Moreover, it cannot see that 
it cannot see this” (Luhmann 1989: 23).
« 61 »  He describes the environment as 
a horizon, as the system-internal correlate 
of all references that extend beyond the sys-
tem, and that can be pushed back by system 
operations. As an internal premise, the sys-
tem’s environment has no boundaries nor 
needs any:
“  The  horizon  always  recedes  when  it  is  ap-
proached, but only in accordance with the system’s 
own operations. It can never be pushed through 
or transcended, because it is not a boundary.” 
(Luhmann 1989: 22)
« 62 »  But when the system is observed 
by  another  system,  this  observing  system 
can  also  observe  the  constraints  that  the 
observed system enforces on itself through 
its own mode of operation. It can observe 
the horizons of the observed system so that 
what they exclude becomes evident. Follow-
ing Maturana, Luhmann calls this “second-
order observation.” This clarifies the mode 
of  operation  of  the  system/environment-
relations in a kind of “second-order cyber-
netics”:
“  At present, second-order cybernetics seems to 
be the place where the problems of the founda-
tions of logic and epistemology can, at least, be 
handled if not ‘solved’.” (Luhmann 1989: 23)
« 63 »  However,  as  we  noted  above, 
Luhmann  uses  one  and  the  same  term, 
Umwelt/environment,  for  both  inside  and 
outside  perspectives  on  environment.  of 
course, any “outside perspective” by an ob-
server of the system is also an inside per-
spective for that observer. But still, if we do 
not  distinguish  between  the  environment 
seen from within and the environment as 
seen from some other perspective, we have 
a meaningful difference that we are not able 
to communicate. Luhmann was also, or be-
came, aware of this need, perhaps through 
reading von Uexküll. At least he refers to 
von Uexküll (1928, 1934), and mentions that 
in biology he showed an early awareness of 
the fact that the environment of an animal 
is not that which we would describe as its 
surroundings or milieu, and that we can see 
more (or perhaps fewer) and other things 
than those an animal can perceive and pro-
cess:
“  This also means that one deals with a differ-
ent environment depending on whether one has 
in mind an environment as defined by a system 
–  that  is,  the  external  reference  of  a  particular 
system – or whether one assumes the existence of 
an external observer whose environment includes 
the system as well as its environment. It is entirely 
possible that the external observer can see many 
more and quite different things that are not nec-
essarily accessible to the system itself… Hence, 
two  concepts  of  environment  must  be  distin-
guished.” (Luhmann 2006: 50–51)
« 64 »  However,  Luhmann  never  at-
tached different terms to those two concepts 
of environment.6 Maybe the reason for this 
is  that  since  Luhmann  deals  strictly  with 
communicative  systems,  he  does  not  face 
the  strong  dual  context  of  living  systems, 
whereas  the  biologist  constantly  switches 
between the (outside) perspective of physi-
co-chemical principles and properties and 
the  (inside)  perspective  of  interpretation 
and significance. In any case, compared to 
von  Uexküll  and  Maturana  &  Varela,  this 
seems to lead to some lack of clarity in Luh-
mann’s use of the term “environment.”
« 65 »  We follow Maturana & Varela in 
making a clear distinction between the envi-
ronment seen from within and without, and 
maintain that this is a key point in any ex-
plicit constructivist and perspectivist theory.
« 66 »  Lack of clarity on this distinction 
leads  to  contradictions.  According  to  von 
Uexküll, the complexity of the environment 
(Umwelt in the sense of phenomenological 
world) is conditioned on the complexity of 
the system – more complex organisms have 
more  complex  environments  and  the  en-
vironment is always less complex than the 
system. Luhmann, on the other hand, often 
states that the environment is always more 
6 |  The quote above is from a lecture held in 
1991. In his large, later book on society we can 
find  no  indication  that  Luhmann  followed  his 
own call to distinguish between the environment 
as defined by the system itself and the environ-
ment of the system for an external observer (e.g., 
1997: 60ff, 128ff, 1025).
complex  than  the  system  (e.g.,  Luhmann 
1995: 182, Krause 2005: 10).
« 67 »  He  argues  that  society  is  com-
posed merely of communications and that 
the  highly  complex  arrangement  of  indi-
vidual  macromolecules,  individual  cells, 
individual nervous systems, and individual 
psychic systems belongs to its environment. 
No society can bring about the “requisite va-
riety” or corresponding degree of complex-
ity for such an environment:
“  However  complex  its  linguistic  possibilities 
and however subtle the structure of its themes, 
society can never make possible communication 
about everything that occurs in its environment 
on all levels of system formation for all systems.” 
(Luhmann 1995: 182)
« 68 »  Here  Luhmann  is  clearly  using 
“environment” in the sense of “surrounding 
world” from the perspective of an outside 
observer,  or  maybe  even  an  ideal  outside 
observer, from where the world outside the 
system  is  obviously  much  more  complex 
than the system. From an outside perspec-
tive the development of the complexity of 
the system can be discussed in relation to 
the complexity of the environment, and it is 
possible to speak of the system’s indifference 
to its environment (or ignorance of the en-
vironment).
« 69 »  As Luhmann states, a perspective 
cannot see what is beyond its observation-
al horizon, and even though we can try to 
observe this horizon and what is beyond it 
from many other perspectives, we can never 
fully capture “the whole world.” We believe 
that a basic implication of the fundamental 
observer-dependency  of  constructivism  is 
that we need to be able to talk about that 
which we refer to beyond the observational 
horizons from any given perspective. Fol-
lowing  the  perspectivist  tradition  from 
Kant and the development into semiotics in 
Charles S. Peirce, we therefore add yet an-
other perspective to the inside and outside 
perspectives, namely a transcendental per-
spective.7
7 |  We  agree  with  Nöth  (2011)  that  while 
Peircean semiotics cannot be considered a pre-
cursor of constructivism as such, it is concerned 
with some of the same key questions as (radical) 
constructivism  and  provides  a  framework  that E
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« 70 »  According to Kant and Peirce, the 
phenomena  or  immediate  objects  that  we 
experience refer to something beyond the 
horizon of the phenomenal world, to what 
Kant calls noumena or transcendent objects, 
the thing in itself, and Peirce calls dynamical 
or “really efficient” objects (Palmquist 1993: 
App. VIII, Alrøe & Noe 2011, Nöth 2011).8
“  We have to distinguish the Immediate object, 
which is the object as the Sign itself represents it, 
and whose Being is thus dependent upon the Rep-
resentation of it in the Sign, from the Dynamical 
object, which is the Reality which by some means 
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representa-
tion.” (Peirce CP 4.536)
« 71 »  Phenomena  are  immediately  ac-
cessible to us, whereas dynamical objects can 
only be referred to. A consequence of this is 
the basic insight that in any first order per-
spective, we only have access to the environ-
ment in the form of our phenomenal world. 
In none of the three theories have we found 
concepts corresponding to these more ad-
vanced, we believe, constructivist and per-
can advance constructivist and perspectivist ap-
proaches.
8 |  See  Ransdell  (2007)  for  an  account  of 
the difference between Kant’s thing in itself and 
Peirce’s dynamical object.
spectivist concepts for the relation between 
the multitude of phenomenal worlds and the 
idea of a shared world. But as Brier (1999) 
notes, both von Foerster’s and von Uexküll’s 
theories still retain the idea of one Universe, 
the independent something that everything 
was evolved from, and Maturana and Varela 
(1980: 11) also work with a shared evolution 
on earth as a basic precondition.
« 72 »  In  a  constructivist  understand-
ing, there is of course no “objective world” 
and no “god’s eye view” from where to see 
“the  world  as  it  really  is”  or  “the  whole 
world.” “The world” is the blind spot of all 
observation, according to Luhmann – that 
which one must presuppose in all observa-
tion.  Instead  of  a  real  outer  world,  “real-
ity” is a resistance in cognition. “Reality is 
that which you don’t see, when you see it” 
(Krause 2005: 213; own translation).9 In a 
more constructive sense, the world is a limit 
case, like the concept of truth in Peirce’s phi-
losophy, where truth is an ideal concept for 
that which we will eventually reach through 
continued inquiry.
« 73 »  In table 1, the three types of per-
spectives, inside, outside, and transcenden-
tal, are used to provide a basic structure for 
the different terms for environment that we 
9 |  “Die Realität ist das, was man nicht erk-
ennt, wenn man sie erkent.”
have discussed above. The column headings 
in the table are the terms that we have cho-
sen to use here for the different concepts of 
environment connected to the three types 
of perspectives. Below are the terms used 
for these concepts of environment used in 
the three different theories that have been 
treated above. Furthermore, the concepts of 
Kant and Peirce have been added to make 
clear how we see the connections between 
the concepts.
4. the observation 
of environments
4.1. Observation as distinction 
or representation
« 74 »  Having looked at different points 
of  view  or  observational  positions  on  the 
environment in relation to the three theo-
ries, we now turn to the deeper differences 
in how they observe the environment. As 
we will show here, there are two very differ-
ent logics of observation involved, which we 
characterize as distinction and representa-
tion.
« 75 »  Luhmann takes a genuinely radi-
cal  constructivist  approach  to  cognition: 
cognition is only possible because it has no 
access to realities outside itself – because it 
Concepts of 
environment
Phenomenal world 
or umwelt 
Niche or adaptive 
world
surrounding 
world “External reality” “the whole world”
perspective
in
inside or first- order (emic) outside or second-order (etic) transcendental
Von Uexküll Umwelt Wohnwelt Umgebung Die Welt
Maturana & Varela
world or
environment for the system
 environment or
 environment of the system
Maturana (1988) niche environment
Luhmann environment/Umwelt environment/Umwelt
Die Welt  
or Die Realität
Kant
phenomena or immanent 
objects
noumena or 
transcendent objects
Welt an sich
Peirce immediate objects dynamical objects
Table 1:  Concepts of environment from different points of view, showing the terms used by von Uexküll, Maturana & Varela, and Luhmann, 
and placing the concepts of Kant and Peirce in relation to them. Note: The terms used by Uexküll have not been translated here because 
there are so many alternative translations. However, the column headings can be considered translations of Uexküll’s terms.47
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is operationally closed – and the premise of 
a common world is replaced with a theory 
of observation of observing systems (Luh-
mann 1998: 164ff). In his theory of social 
systems, the system is defined as the differ-
ence between system and environment, and 
observation is basically an act of distinction 
(Luhmann 1995: 36, 1998: 167ff).10 Based 
on  the  logic  of  distinction  developed  by 
George Spencer-Brown (2009) in his Laws 
of form, he formulates a general conception 
of  observation  as  indication  by  means  of 
distinction: “observation is the unity of the 
difference between distinction and indica-
tion” (Krause 2005: 88, own translation)11. 
In this he builds on the biological autopoi-
esis theory, which also operates with Spen-
cer-Brown’s logic of distinction (Maturana 
& Varela 1998: 40), as elaborated in particu-
lar by Varela (1979).
« 76 »  Von Uexküll is less explicit about 
the kind of logic behind his Bedeutungsleh-
re. However, his theory can be classified as 
“general semiotics” (Uexküll t. 1992). In the 
field of biosemiotics he is considered one of 
the founders and ongoing sources of inspi-
ration along with Charles S. Peirce (Hoff-
meyer 1996; Emmeche 2001).
« 77 »  Von Uexküll devoted himself to 
two tasks, how the representation of an “ob-
jective” external world can be derived from a 
subjective universe, and how animals act as 
sign receivers (Uexküll t. 1992):
“  While constructing our world the sensations of 
the mind become the properties of things, or, as 
one can also put it, the subjective qualities form 
the objective world. Replacing sensation or sub-
jective quality with perceptual sign, one can say 
that  the  perceptual  signs  of  our  attention  turn 
into  perceptual  cues  of  the  world.”  (Uexküll 
1973:  102;  translation  from  Thure  von  Uexküll 
1992: 292–293)
10 |  Luhmann has stated that if he were to 
define an undeniable core in systems theory with-
out which the whole system would disintegrate, it 
would consist of his thoughts on and sociological 
application of Spencer-Brown’s calculus of form 
and theory about observation as operation (An-
dersen 2003).
11 |  “Beobachtung is die Einheit der Differ-
enz von Unterscheidung und Bezeichnung.”
« 78 »  Von Uexküll here makes a distinc-
tion between perceptual sign (Merkzeichen) 
and “perceptual cue” or “characteristic fea-
ture”  (Merkmal),  where  each  perceptual 
cue is a perceptual sign that is “transposed 
to the outside.” In other words, whereas the 
perceptual sign is received as an ego-qual-
ity of a sensory cell within the subject, the 
perceptual cue lies outside in the space of 
the external world (Uexküll t. 1992). The 
expression “transposed to the outside” thus 
forms the same function as Peirce’s idea that 
the immediate objects within the sign refer 
to dynamical or really efficient objects out-
side the sign.
« 79 »  In this light, we can identify the 
basic logic in von Uexküll’s work as a logic of 
representation similar to Peirce’s semiotics. 
The system, the organism, is characterised 
in terms of meaning, and observation is ba-
sically an act of representation.12
« 80 »  This difference between the logic 
of distinction and the logic of representa-
tion goes deep, and it goes across the dif-
ference  between  the  fields  of  biology  and 
sociology. Based on a perspectivist view, the 
approach to such differences between per-
spectives is to clarify how the perspectives 
are different, what consequences the differ-
ences have for the observations made, and 
how the perspectives can possible be used 
in a coordinated way (Alrøe & Noe 2011). 
Among those who have noted this marked 
difference (though we have not seen it char-
acterised as a difference of logic), are for in-
stance tom Ziemke & Nöel Sharkey (2001: 
734), who write that a common criticism of 
Maturana & Varela’s theory of autopoiesis 
is its disregard for such concepts as repre-
sentation and information.13 Therefore, they 
12 |  Note that the Peircean notion of repre-
sentation is very complex, general, and dynamic, 
and cannot be equated with the simplistic AI idea 
of representation as a direct mapping between in-
ternal symbols and external objects (Nöth 1997). 
The  ‘anti-representationalist’  views  of  cognition 
(e.g., Varela 1991) are thus directed against a re-
stricted and simplistic view of ‘representation’ and 
not the semiotic and triadic model of representa-
tion (Emmeche 2001).
13 |  They do note, however, that Varela et, 
Thompson & Rosch (1991) formulation of an en-
active cognitive science is to a large extent com-
patible with an interactive view of representation.
conclude,  many  cognitive  scientists,  and 
certainly many researchers in semiotics, will 
probably  prefer  the  theoretical  framework 
of  Uexküll,  whose  theories  emphasize  the 
central role of sign processes in all aspects 
of life.
« 81 »  Along  the  same  lines,  Brier 
writes that even though the epistemologi-
cal theory of Maturana & Varela is a kind 
of constructivism, it is based on phenom-
enological  mechanicism  and  not  a  theory 
of how signification is created: “Cybernetic 
and autopoietic theories fail to elucidate the 
phenomenological reality of perception and 
cognition – especially that of animals” (Brier 
2008: 326).
« 82 »  By building on the very general 
concept  of  observation  defined  as  indica-
tion by means of a distinction, Luhmann’s 
theory is confined to a form of binary log-
ic.14 In contrast, the (bio-)semiotic concept 
of observation from Peirce and von Uexküll 
(1982) is based on a richer conception of 
meaning and reference (where “indication” 
is just one of three basic types of sign: icons, 
indexes, and symbols15) and the genuinely 
triadic form of representation as the rela-
tion of sign, object, and interpretant, which 
cannot be reduced to binary logic (Peirce CP 
3.483).
« 83 »  Luhmann  (2006)  himself  ac-
knowledged  the  difference  between  the 
binary form of distinction and the triadic 
semiotics  of  Peirce.  He  suggested  that  se-
miotics could be “redrawn” in the form of 
distinction, where the sign is the difference 
between  signifier  and  signified  (Luhmann 
2006: 45). We think (in line with Brier 2001) 
that this is not at all sufficient to replace the 
conceptually much richer Peircean concep-
tion of observation as representation. First 
of all it misses out the key concept of the 
interpretant, and second it does not capture 
the distinction between immediate and dy-
namical objects.
« 84 »  on  the  other  hand,  one  of  the 
strengths of observation as distinction is the 
14 |  Spencer-Brown himself showed that his 
“calculus of indications” was equivalent to Bool-
ean algebra (Spencer-Brown 2009: 90ff).
15 |  Roughly, an index works by pointing at 
its object, an icon by resembling its object, and a 
symbol by way of a purely conventional rule or 
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awareness of conditions for observation and 
unavoidable blind spots. The observer sees 
what she sees and does not see that she can-
not see that which she cannot see. In other 
words, the distinction between observer and 
observed defines the blind spot of observa-
tion. All distinctions carry with them their 
own blind spot, since an indication always 
occurs  within  the  scope  of  a  distinction, 
which  hence  determines  the  observation 
(e.g.,  Andersen  2003).  Luhmann  is  very 
aware of the need for a reflexive approach to 
observation, and the “blind spot” of obser-
vation is one of his key concepts.
« 85 »  The two logics are incompatible: 
they  exclude  each  other  in  the  sense  that 
they cannot be used in the same observa-
tion.  on  the  other  hand,  observation  as 
distinction shows things that observation as 
representation cannot, and vice versa. This 
means that the two are complementary in 
Niels Bohr’s sense: they exclude each other 
from  being  applied  at  the  same  time,  but 
only their conjunction gives the full under-
standing of the phenomena.
4.2. Observation and interaction
« 86 »  An  important  consequence  of 
Luhmann’s definition of observation as dis-
tinction is that in this very abstract and gen-
eral conception of observation there is no 
space for interaction.
“  observations can only influence observations, 
can  only  transform  distinctions  into  other  dis-
tinctions, can, in other words, only process infor-
mation; but not touch things in the environment 
– with the important, but very small exception of 
all that which involves structural couplings. Also 
for observing systems, there is on the level of their 
operations  no  contact  with  the  environment.” 
(Luhmann 1997: 92; translation by the authors)16
16 |  “Beobachtungen  können  nur  auf  Be-
obachtungen  einwirken,  können  nur  Unter-
scheidungen in andere Unterscheidungen trans-
formieren,  können,  mit  anderen  worten,  nur 
Information  verarbeiten;  aber  nicht  Dinge  der 
Umwelt berühren – mit der wichtigen, aber sehr 
schmalen Ausnahme all dessen, was über struk-
turelle  Kopplungen  involviert  ist.  Auch  für  be-
obachtende Systeme gibt es auf der Ebene ihres 
operierens keinen Umweltkontakt.“ (Emphasis in 
original quote.)
« 87 »  Although  Luhmann  uses  bio-
logical autopoiesis theory as a main point of 
departure for his general systems theory, he 
does not adopt the conception of cognition 
originally connected with the theory (Alrøe 
2000).  Maturana  &  Varela  (1998:  44–45) 
characterise cognition as effective action, an 
action that allows a living being to sustain 
its existence in a certain environment as it 
reproduces its world – no more, no less.
« 88 »  In the biosemiotic tradition fol-
lowing von Uexküll, there is also a close con-
nection between representation and interac-
tion (Alrøe & Noe 2011). This is strongly 
expressed in his conception of the Umwelt 
as consisting of both Merkwelt and Wirk-
welt (Uexküll 1992).
« 89 »  In contrast to Maturana & Varela, 
Luhmann does not have a connection be-
tween cognition and action. For him, social 
systems are strictly communicative systems, 
and autopoiesis and cognition is the same 
kind of process.
“  The consequence, at least for social systems, is 
that autopoietic reproduction and the operations 
of self-description and self-observation that use 
the  system/environment  difference  within  the 
system cannot be separated.” (Luhmann 1995: 
167)
« 90 »  There is only one kind of opera-
tion: communication based on observations 
as  distinctions.  The  problem  with  Luh-
mann’s radical abstraction is that it does not 
support the important aspects of our lives 
that are based on the connection between 
cognition and action, or between represen-
tation and interaction, such as learning and 
meaning.
“  … the tendency in cognitive science to abstrac-
tion, i.e., for factoring out situated perception and 
motor skills, misses the essence of cognitive intel-
ligence which resides only in its embodiment.” 
(Varela 1991: 96)
« 91 »  Much  communication  is  closely 
connected  to  a  practice  and  a  practical 
function  in  society  (trade,  punishment, 
consumption,  construction,  production, 
transport, sport, war, health, sex, food, sci-
ence, etc.). If society is a social system and 
social systems are only communicative, then 
society has no body. This goes against the 
insight from Maturana & Varela and others 
that cognition is embodied. And if society 
has no body, it does not have a (non-com-
municative) environment either, consisting 
of ecosystems, climate, etc., which are key 
elements  in  today’s  wicked  environmental 
problems.
« 92 »  As we have shown, meaning is a 
key concept in von Uexküll, and representa-
tion entails meaning or significance for the 
organism:
“  …every  action…  that  consists  of  percep-
tion and operation imprints its meaning on the 
meaningless object and thereby makes it into a 
subject-related meaning-carrier in the respective 
Umwelt.” (Uexküll 1982: 31)
« 93 »  The concept of meaning is very 
different  in  Luhmann.  According  to  Brier 
(2001: 799), Luhmann does not really work 
with signification, since he, like Maturana 
& Varela, assumes meaning as granted. He 
does not work with a theoretical foundation 
of meaning from a phenomenological point 
of view other than that it is a surplus of in-
terpretive  possibilities  and  that  he  wants 
to leave behind all idea of a transcendental 
subject. Therefore Luhmann misses an im-
portant  point  in  Uexküll’s  work  and  phe-
nomenological  theory,  and  he  fails  to  see 
how important the biological level is for a 
theory of meaning.
« 94 »  For  Luhmann,  meaning  is  the 
unity of the difference between the actual 
and  the  possible.  In  a  “phenomenological 
description,” he says that “meaning equips 
an actual experience or action with redun-
dant  possibilities.”  (Luhmann  1995:  60). 
He also says (somewhat vaguely!) that “it is 
better to avoid references to anything spe-
cific, since they always exclude something, 
and to introduce the concept of meaning as 
a concept ‘devoid of difference’ and intend-
ing itself along with” (Luhmann 1995: 59f), 
in the sense that: “meaning always refers to 
meaning and never reaches out of itself for 
something else” (Luhmann 1995: 62).
« 95 »  In his article Meaning as sociol-
ogy’s basic concept, he states that “Meaning 
… overtaxes the potential of actual experi-
ence by including and presenting what is not 
directly experienced.” (Luhmann 1990: 30). 
But this occurs only within an individual life 
of consciousness. Here the contents that are 49
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actualized in perception or thought change 
ceaselessly from moment to moment, and 
meaning  functions  as  a  selection  rule  to 
select from other possibilities, and not – or 
only secondarily – as an actual content ap-
pearing in consciousness. In his little article 
Complexity and meaning, he further argues 
that “meaning is nothing but a way to expe-
rience  and  to  handle  enforced  selectivity” 
(Luhmann 1990: 82).
« 96 »  Luhmann says little about expe-
riential learning, except on a rather abstract 
level:  for  example,  “expectations  that  are 
willing to learn are stylized as cognitions. 
one is ready to change them if reality re-
veals  other,  unanticipated  aspects”  (Luh-
mann 1995: 320). But he does not describe 
how reality reveals. However, the concept of 
expectation (or habit, in Peirce’s terms – be-
lief is a habit of action) is important in un-
derstanding the differences in how learning 
and adaptation are perceived in the different 
perspectives.
« 97 »  Luhmann considers science as a 
functional subsystem (among other subsys-
tems) of a differentiated society. He states 
that the code of scientific truth and falsity 
is directed specifically toward a communi-
cative processing of experience, i.e., of se-
lections that are not attributed to the com-
municators  themselves  (Luhmann  1989: 
77–78). However, this seems only to capture 
the communicational aspect of science that 
has to do with peer criticism – the cognitive 
aspect of science as experiential learning is 
left out (cf. Alrøe 2000).
« 98 »  We believe that the notion of em-
bodied learning is a key concept in under-
standing  the  relation  between  system  and 
environment, both in science and in a more 
general context:17
“  Within this emerging framework, learning is 
conceived and acted out as an organic, embod-
ied process based on the ‘inseparability between 
a particular way of being and the way the world 
appears to us,’ so that ‘every act of knowing brings 
forth a world’.” (Horn & Wilburn 2005: 747, re-
ferring to Maturana & Varela 1998: 26)
17 |  More generally, adaptation can be seen 
as a form of learning in the sense of Gregory Bate-
son’s logical types (or levels) of learning (Bateson, 
1972: 279–308).
4.3. Observing complex 
environments
« 99 »  In the previous section we high-
lighted  some  strengths  and  weaknesses  of 
Luhmann’s theory compared to Maturana & 
Varela and von Uexküll. Now we return to 
our starting point, the prospects for applying 
different constructivist theories to the wick-
edness of complex environmental problems. 
From  our  point  of  view,  the  strictly  com-
municational structure of Luhmann’s social 
systems theory and the logic of observation 
as distinction is a key weakness when observ-
ing complex environments. For instance, it 
seems to us that it counteracts the budding 
acknowledgement  in  economics  that  there 
is a need for alternatives to the dominating 
neo-classical  economics,  such  as  ecological 
economics, which set ecological boundaries 
to social and economic systems, and which 
in this way treat human societies more like 
organisms that depend on their environment.
« 100 »  In this section we will, however, 
briefly  underline  some  of  the  particular 
strengths that social systems theory brings 
to  the  bouquet  of  constructivist  theories 
when it comes to addressing complex en-
vironmental  problems,  and  illustrate  this 
with some concrete examples from our own 
work.
« 101 »  First of all, Luhmann treats social 
systems (including the systems of science) in 
a way that the two other theories are not ca-
pable of. And we do need theories of social 
systems to observe and handle the relations 
between  complex  systems  and  their  com-
plex environments – theories that are able to 
handle aspects such as self-reference, auto-
poiesis, and operational closure.
« 102 »  In our own work, we have used 
Luhmann’s theory in connection with com-
plementary  semiotic  theories  to  observe 
and  analyse  the  relation  between  systems 
and  their  environment  for  heterogeneous 
systems such as farming systems, which are 
technological and biological but also social 
systems  (e.g.,  Noe  &  Alrøe  2006,  2012). 
The  semiotic  theories  (Peirce,  biosemiot-
ics,  actor-network  theory)  are  strong  in 
their ability to handle the heterogeneity of 
such systems, but lack the strong concepts 
of self-organization and operational closure 
that Luhmann’s theory offers to handle these 
aspects, which are evidently there in our em-
pirical investigations.
« 103 »  Secondly, Luhmann (1989: 15ff) 
uses the concept of resonance to explain the 
basic  condition  for  there  being  (autono-
mous) systems that would not exist as sys-
tems if they did not screen themselves off 
from environmental influences. They reso-
nate with the environment only on the basis 
of their own frequencies (with an analogy 
from physics), and they only produce very 
selective  interconnections  in  the  form  of 
couplings. Resonance with the environment 
is not something to be expected; on the con-
trary, it is improbable according to systems 
theory:
“  From the evolutionary point of view one can 
even say that sociocultural evolution is based on 
the premise that society does not have to react to 
its environment and that it would not have taken 
us where it has if it had proceeded differently.” 
Luhmann (1989: 16)
« 104 »  The  concept  of  resonance  as-
sumes second-order cybernetics; it presup-
poses a reality that triggers no resonance at 
all within the system, and shows the inher-
ent constraints on any observational effort 
(Luhmann 1989: 25). The observed system 
constructs the reality of its world through a 
recursive calculation of its calculations, and 
since this is the case on the level of living, 
neurophysiological, and conscious systems, 
Luhmann argues, it cannot be different for 
social systems either. It can draw no other 
conclusion than that this applies to its own 
observation too, but at the same time it can 
still see that what cannot be seen cannot be 
seen.
« 105 »  In our own work, this is a key 
insight  into  the  nature  of  communication 
in the social systems of food and science, 
which we have to deal with when making 
complex assessments of the effects of food 
systems on their environment,18 and which 
forms an important basis for the develop-
ment of a genuinely perspectivist methodol-
ogy (e.g., Alrøe & Noe 2011).
« 106 »  Third, there is the extensive theo-
ry of differentiation in social systems theory, 
18 |  Reduction of complexity in the commu-
nication of assessments of effects of food systems 
on their environment, for instance through trust 
and visualisation, is one of three key challenges 
for the Multitrust project.E
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which seems pivotal in addressing complex 
environmental problems:
“  …complex systems like societies are differen-
tiated into subsystems that treat other social do-
mains  as  their  (socially  internal)  environment, 
i.e., differentiate themselves within the society, for 
example, as a legally ordered political system that 
can treat the economy, science, etc. as environ-
ment and thereby relieve itself of direct political 
responsibility for their operations. This differen-
tiation theorem has far-reaching consequences.” 
(Luhmann 1989: 19)
« 107 »  It is just as suggestive as it is mis-
leading to assume that “the” system reacts 
to “the” environment, even if this is only to 
“its” own idea of “the” environment, as Luh-
mann puts it. The idea of “the” environment 
of society is suddenly obviously dubious.
« 108 »  In our work, we have used the 
theory  of  functional  differentiation  and 
structural couplings to analyse how decou-
pling due to the increasing differentiation of 
agriculture and food networks creates prob-
lems of sustainability, and as a new approach 
to look at sustainability solutions by way of 
recoupling and new forms of coupling (e.g., 
Noe & Alrøe 2012).
« 109 »  Fourth, and equally important, is 
the notion of second-order observation ap-
plied to the social and scientific perspectives 
that are applied to solve complex problems. 
to analyse the problem of the exposure to 
ecological  dangers  with  the  necessary  ex-
actness, second-order cybernetics must be 
taken as the starting-point. In contrast to a 
naive faith in science, second-order obser-
vation together with its theoretical appara-
tus is not “objectively better” knowledge but 
only a different knowledge that takes itself 
for better (Luhmann 1989: 25).
« 110 »  If the starting-point was an “ob-
jectively” given reality that was still full of 
surprises  and  unknown  qualities  then  the 
only issue would be to improve science so 
that  it  could  know  the  reality  better.  But 
there are many different systems in society, 
and  since  any  “objective”  approach  would 
by definition be a singular perspective, the 
relations of the other systems to their envi-
ronment would not be grasped sufficiently. 
Even  science  with  its  “better  knowledge” 
often finds no resonance within society, be-
cause its “better” knowledge has no value 
in the environment of other systems or is at 
best a scientific theory for them (Luhmann 
1989: 26).
« 111 »  Any  first-order  observation  of 
the environment is not in a position to grasp 
the problem of environmental sustainabil-
ity:
“  We have to choose a second-order cybernetics 
as the point of departure. We have to see that what 
cannot be seen cannot be seen. only then can we 
discover why it is so difficult for our society to re-
act to the exposure to ecological dangers despite, 
and even because of, its numerous function sys-
tems.” (Luhmann 1989: 26)
« 112 »  Here Luhmann succinctly sums 
up the problem of observing complex envi-
ronments and addressing complex environ-
mental problems. The problem is paradoxi-
cal in the sense that any attempt to solve the 
problem with “doing things better,” such as 
better science, better implementation, better 
communication,  better  decision  processes, 
better  access  for  stakeholder  groups,  etc., 
will fail or will even deepen the problem. 
This is because these solutions do not take 
into account the differentiation of observing 
systems in society, and the ensuing differ-
entiation of the environments of observing 
systems. The problem is the acquisition of a 
different kind of insight:
“  In many ways modern society has opened up 
possibilities for observing and describing how its 
systems operate and under what conditions they 
observe their environment. The only drawback is 
that this observing of observing is not disciplined 
enough  by  self-observation.  It  appears  as  bet-
ter knowledge. But in reality it is only a particu-
lar kind of observing of its own environment.” 
(Luhmann 1989: 26–27)
« 113 »  From  our  viewpoint,  the  prob-
lem Luhmann points out here is the lack of 
an adequate perspectivism (cf Alrøe & Noe 
2011). We have applied this insight in some 
concrete  examples  of  research  methodol-
ogy and policy by way of suggesting sepa-
rate second-order observation processes (in 
the  form  of  “polyocular  communication”) 
as necessary elements in inter- and trans-
disciplinary  research  on  multifunctional 
agriculture and organic agriculture (Noe et 
al. 2008, Alrøe & Noe 2008). At present, we 
are striving to implement these insights in 
the  form  of  multiperspectival  methods  in 
the transdisciplinary projects Multitrust19 – 
which will analyse and develop methods for 
multicriteria assessment of the effects of or-
ganic food systems – and HealthyGrowth20 
– which will make transnational analyses of 
successful mid-scale organic value chains in 
order to learn how they are able to combine 
volume and values.
« 114 »  Communicating  across  spe-
cialised  perspectives  requires  much  dedi-
cation and reflexiveness, and, as Luhmann 
emphasises,  such  cross-perspectival  work 
requires  a  certain  modesty  to  avoid  that 
some  perspectives  dominate  others  and 
mould  them  in  their  own  image.  In  the 
words of Cilliers (2005):
“  The view from complexity argues for the neces-
sity of modest positions. In order to open up the 
possibility of a better future we need to resist the 
arrogance of certainty and self-sufficient knowl-
edge.”
« 115 »  The  conception  that  every  ob-
servation  has  a  blind  spot  and  that  every 
perspective cannot see beyond its own hori-
zon seems a particularly good starting point 
for accepting a modest approach.
Conclusion
« 116 »  In this article we have discussed 
three  different  constructivist  theories  and 
their understanding of the relation between 
system and environment, with the dual pur-
pose of developing a constructivist and per-
spectivist  conception  of  environment  and 
to  help  confront  “wicked”  complex  envi-
ronmental problems through constructivist 
systems approaches.
« 117 »  The first step was to clarify the 
sense in which different terms for “the envi-
ronment” were used, and how they relate to 
19 |  Multitrust runs 2011–2013 as part of the 
organic RDD programme, which is coordinated 
by ICRoFS and funded by the Danish Ministry of 
food (see http://www.multitrust.org).
20 |  HealthyGrowth  will  run  2013–2015 
as  part  of  Core  organic  II,  which  is  an  ERA-
NEt funded by the European Commission’s 7th 
Framework Programme.51
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inside and outside perspectives on environ-
ments, here labelled as “phenomenal worlds” 
and “surrounding worlds.” The second step 
was to dig deeper and identify the differ-
ent logics connected to their conceptions of 
observation, upon which the theories – be-
ing  constructivist  theories  –  are  founded. 
We identified two very different logics: the 
logic of distinction (Spencer-Brown’s Laws 
of  Form)  and  the  logic  of  representation 
(Peircean  semiotics).  These  two  logics  are 
complementary in Niels Bohr’s sense; that 
is, they exclude each other from being ap-
plied at the same time, but their conjunction 
gives a fuller understanding of what is being 
observed.
« 118 »  Complex  environmental  prob-
lems are inherently multiperspectival, and 
we need theories for how to handle the many 
different perspectives on “the environment” 
and environmental sustainability. Construc-
tivist theories are pivotal here, both because 
constructivism is the route to an adequate 
perspectivism that can handle multiple and 
complementary  perspectives,  and  because 
the different varieties of what can broadly 
be  called  environmental  research,  can  be 
sharpened by constructivist theories. How-
ever, as we have seen, there are not one but 
several different, and in some ways incom-
patible, constructivist approaches to the en-
vironment.
« 119 »  Luhmann’s theory of social sys-
tems is in many ways an eye-opening theory. 
It highlights crucial points for the sciences 
of complex systems and complex problems, 
such  as  sustainable  food  production  and 
climate  change  mitigation,  where  society, 
social  systems,  and  communication  play 
decisive  roles.  Especially,  his  strong  con-
structivist elaboration of observation of ob-
servation and the blind spots of observation 
can help overcome blind faith in “objective 
knowledge,” and support the development 
of  perspectivist  approaches  based  on  sec-
ond-order observation. Perspectivism is as 
much realism as we can get.
« 120 »  In order to be able to utilize the 
strength  of  Luhmann’s  very  elaborate  and 
stringent  theory  more  widely,  which  we 
highly  recommend,  we  need  to  consider 
carefully Luhmann’s own call for a modest 
approach that is disciplined by self-observa-
tion. In particular, we need to consider the 
blind spots that are created by the funda-
mental assumptions of strictly communica-
tive social systems and the logic of distinc-
tion. only in this way can we ensure that 
this  comprehensive  and  promising  theory 
does not appear as “better knowledge” but 
as a helpful perspective on the wicked en-
vironmental problems of society, to be used 
in conjunction with perspectives based on 
embodied learning, semiotics, and the logic 
of representation.
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the Construction of Embodied 
agency: the Other side of the 
system–Environment Coin
Tom Ziemke
University of Skövde, Sweden 
tom.ziemke/at/his.se
>  upshot  •  Complementary  to  Alrøe 
and  Noe’s  discussion  of  constructiv-
ist notions of environment, world, etc., 
this commentary addresses the closely-
related notion of agency in constructiv-
ist theories – in particular, the question 
of what would be required for artificial 
agency  –  and  identifies  open  ques-
tions  and  fundamental  disagreements 
among constructivist theorists. 
« 1 »  The target paper by Hugo Alrøe 
and Egon Noe provides an insightful expo-
sition and discussion of different construc-
tivist theorists’ conception of the environ-
ment/world  that  systems/agents/subjects 
interact  with.  The  nature  of  the  systems 
that  these  theorists  (Jakob  von  Uexküll, 
Humberto  Maturana  &  Francisco  Varela, 
and Niklas Luhmann) take as their unit of 
analysis varies significantly – from cells to 
organisms/animals to social systems – but 
they  nevertheless  share  a  basic  commit-
ment to viewing autonomy or autopoiesis 
as a key aspect of what constitutes such a 
“system” – or the relevant type of system – 
in the first place. 
« 2 »  For research in cognitive robotics 
or,  more  broadly,  situated  and  embodied 
artificial  intelligence  (AI),  which  is  con-
cerned with the construction – in both the 
literal and the conceptual sense – of robotic 
systems  that  interact  with  and  adapt  to 
their environments relatively independent 
of human control, there is the additional 
question of what exactly would constitute 
an  artificial  agent/subject.  Constructivist 
theories can make important contributions 
to understanding the issues involved, but 
the question can also, vice versa, be used 
to identify important differences between 
different  constructivist  theories  and  thus 
further  the  development  of  radical  con-
structivism as such. 
« 3 »  The  discussion  in  this  com-
mentary will focus on the theories of von 
Uexküll, Maturana, and Varela. This is be-
cause they are more directly relevant to the 
question of individual biological vs. robotic 
embodied  agency  and  better-explored  in 
this particular research context than Luh-
mann’s work. As Alrøe and Noe point out 
in §§93–98, Luhmann does not address in 
sufficient  detail  the  relevance  of  the  bio-
logical level for a theory of meaning (§93) 
and therefore does not have much to say 
on the type of embodied learning/adapta-
tion (§98) that is crucial to robotic systems’ 
knowledge  construction  in  sensorimotor 
interaction with the environment. on the 
other hand, as discussed in much detail by 
Kåhre (2009, 2010), Luhmann’s work is of 
course  highly  relevant  to  understanding 
the  social  and  societal  significance  of  AI 
technology  in  a  broader  sense,  including 
Internet search engines such as Google.
« 4 »  Notions of artificial autonomous 
agency  in  situated/embodied  AI  research 
strongly  emphasize  sensorimotor  interac-
tion  with  the  environment  and  indepen-
dence from direct human control. Here are 
two representative examples:
“  By autonomous agent, I mean any embodied 
system designed to satisfy internal or external 
goals  by  its  own  actions  while  in  continuous 
long-term interaction with the environment in 
which  it  is  situated.  The  class  of  autonomous 
agents is thus a fairly broad one, encompassing 
at the very least all animals and autonomous ro-
bots.” (Beer 1995)
“  An  autonomous  agent  is  a  system  situated 
within and a part of an environment that senses 
that environment and acts on it, over time, in 
pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect what 
it senses in the future.” (Franklin & Graesser 
1997)
« 5 »  Such definitions can of course be 
questioned from a number of perspectives 
(e.g.,  Sørensen  &  Ziemke  2007;  Ziemke 
2007a,  2007b,  2008).  For  example,  one 
might ask exactly what is meant by “own” 
in  “own  actions”  or  “own  agenda.”  Con-
structivist theories should be able to help 
clarify the issues involved.
« 6 »  The works of von Uexküll, Mat-
urana, and, in particular, Varela have had a 
significant influence on this type of AI re-
search. For example, cognitive  robotics and 
artificial life researchers have explicitly re-
ferred to von Uexküll, in particular his Um-
welt concept (e.g., Uexküll 1973, 1957), in 
their discussions of how a robot’s subjective 
inner world necessarily depends on its sen-
sors and effectors (e.g., Brooks 1986, 1991; 
Prem 1997; Clark 1997; Ziemke 2001), i.e., 
its modes of interaction with the environ-
ment (for examples of concrete implemen-
tations  see  Macinnes  &  Di  Paolo  2005; 
Capdepuy, Polani & Nehaniv 2007). But the 
influence also goes the other way: Varela, 
Thompson  &  Rosch  (1991),  for  example, 
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used Rodney Brooks’s behavior-based ro-
botics approach (e.g., Brooks 1986, 1991) 
as an example/illustration of their enactive 
conception of embodied cognition. 
« 7 »  The organismic roots of the sen-
sorimotor  interaction  between  agent  and 
environment,  however,  have  been  largely 
ignored  in  cognitive  robotics  research 
(cf. Ziemke 2008; Froese & Ziemke 2009; 
Ziemke & Lowe 2009). From a technologi-
cal  perspective,  this  is,  of  course,  hardly 
surprising, given that practically all robots 
have sensors and motors, while no robot 
today is “living” (or autopoietic) in more 
than a metaphorical sense. From the per-
spectives  of  radical  constructivism  and 
embodied cognitive science (e.g., Ziemke, 
Zlatev & Frank 2007), on the other hand, 
the question is exactly how this lack of a 
living body effects/constrains the embod-
ied cognitive capacities of robotic systems. 
« 8 »  Highly  relevant  to  this  question 
is what von Uexküll (1982) considered the 
“principal difference between the construc-
tion of a mechanism and a living organism,” 
namely the fact that “the organs of living 
beings have an innate meaning quality, in 
contrast to the parts of machine; therefore 
they can only develop centrifugally.” That 
means, organisms grow “outwards,” i.e., the 
parts grow from the whole, whereas ma-
chines (at least in von Uexküll’s days) are 
constructed centripetally, i.e., the parts are 
built first and then the whole is constructed 
from them. This (alleged) lack of “innate 
meaning qualities” raises the question of to 
what degree robots could be said to have 
a subjective/phenomenal Umwelt (cf. Em-
meche 2001; Ziemke & Sharkey 2001). Nat-
urally, von Uexküll himself was not familiar 
with modern computer and robotics tech-
nology. However, as we have discussed in 
more detail elsewhere (Ziemke & Sharkey 
2001),  the  fact  remains  that  even  today’s 
robots are still composed (centripetally) of 
mechanical parts, even if their adaptive – 
and to some degree self-organizing – con-
trol programs could be viewed as capable 
of some form of centrifugal development. 
Current research on adaptive/growing ma-
terials as well as on robots with living core 
components (such as a microbial metabo-
lism, cf. Melhuish et al. 2006; Montebelli, 
Lowe & Ziemke in press) is bound to fur-
ther blur the distinctions between organ-
isms and machines that might have seemed 
clear-cut in von Uexküll’s time.
« 9 »  Alvaro Moreno, Arantza Etxeber-
ria, and Jon Umerez characterize agential 
autonomy as implying that the internal or-
ganization of the system causes interactions 
with the environment and its monitoring 
according to internal needs. They therefore 
make a crucial distinction “between consti-
tutive processes, which produce the iden-
tity and largely delimit what the system is, 
from interactive processes, which are not 
only side effects of the constitutive, but cru-
cial to maintain the identity of the system, 
with the specific function of controlling the 
interaction with the environment” (More-
no, Etxeberria & Umerez 2008). 
« 10 »  While  this  view  of  the  inter-
twined nature of constitutive and interac-
tive processes seems to be much in line with 
Maturana & Varela’s (1974, 1980) original 
view of the central role of autopoietic orga-
nization in the constitution of cognition, it 
is interesting to note, from the perspective 
of radical constructivism, that Maturana’s 
and  Varela’s  later  interpretations  actually 
seem to differ substantially on this point. 
Varela (1997) argues that the operational 
closure of nervous systems brings forth a 
specific mode of coherence, i.e. a cognitive 
identity that is embedded in the organism. 
Hence,  he  also  characterizes  the  relation 
between  constitutive  and  interactive  pro-
cesses as necessarily closely intertwined:
“  [t]he cognitive self is the manner in which 
the organism, through its own self-produced ac-
tivity, becomes a distinct entity in space, but al-
ways coupled to its corresponding environment 
from which it remains nevertheless distinct. A 
distinct coherent self which, by the very same 
process of constituting itself, configures, an ex-
ternal world of perception and action.” (Varela 
1997: 83)
« 11 »  Maturana  (2004),  on  the  other 
hand, argues that “[l]iving systems, like all 
systems, exist in two non-intersecting op-
erational domains, the domain of the op-
eration of their components (the domain 
of their composition), and the domain of 
their operation as totalities in the relational 
space in which they exist as such”. He there-
fore argued that robots, despite their non-
biological constitution, could very well be 
capable of self-consciousness if only they 
were made to interact with their environ-
ment the right way (through language in 
this case). He justified this argument as fol-
lows:
“  No doubt the manner of operating of a system 
as  a  totality  arises  from  its  internal  structural 
dynamics through the operation of their com-
ponents, but the character of what it does as a 
totality arises in its encounter with the medium 
in which it exists as a totality. … The same hap-
pens with robots. A robot is a robot of one kind 
or another according to how it arises in its opera-
tion as a totality in the relational space in which 
it exists as such.” (Maturana 2004: 76)
« 12 »  to  briefly  summarize:  the  fact 
that  the  cognitive  robots  used  in  mod-
ern situated/embodied AI research adapt/
learn/self-organize (in a technical sense) in 
and through interaction with their environ-
ments, raises a number of interesting ques-
tions regarding the role of the living body 
in  embodied  cognition.  This  research  is 
also highly interesting from the perspective 
of radical constructivism. This is because it 
raises the question of to what degree, us-
ing the above terms of Moreno, Etxeberria 
& Umerez (2008), the constitutive and in-
teractive processes involved in agential au-
tonomy can or cannot be decoupled. As the 
necessarily brief discussion above seems to 
indicate, it is far from clear to what degree 
constructivist theorists agree on this point. 
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Multiple Environments!?
Karl-Heinz Simon 
University of Kassel 
simon/at/cesr.de
> upshot • The following remarks elabo-
rate on the basic concepts of observation 
and  environment.  Some  extensions  are 
suggested, mainly from the perspective 
of  Luhmann’s  theory  of  social  systems. 
Especially, the concept of structural cou-
plings is given more emphasis, not least 
because of its relevance to the sustain-
ability debate.
« 1 »  The debate on the role of construc-
tivist  approaches  is  of  crucial  relevance  in 
clarifying  benefits  and  difficulties  and,  es-
pecially, in the use of concepts such as “en-
vironment”  and  “observer”  within  such 
approaches. of interest here is its contribu-
tion to epistemology, as well as that on the 
fundaments of social systems theory. Hugo 
Alrøe and Egon Noe’s article is informative 
and helpful in separating several arguments 
that are from different scholars and in differ-
ent discourses.
« 2 »  At the core of the article are two 
central aspects to which some remarks could 
be added: 
1  |  the significance of the discussion, wheth-
er it is about philosophical intention or 
part of a sociological examination, and 
2  |  the use of the term “environment”, either 
as a systems theory concept or as refer-
ring  to  ecological  questions,  including 
physical  or  biological  assertions.  I  am 
going to formulate my remarks on this 
mainly on the Luhmann part of the ar-
ticle.
« 3 »  So, firstly, let me address the level 
at which the argumentation is set. one im-
portant point is to do with the “subject” of 
the  observing  system.  The  important  step 
taken  by  Niklas  Luhmann  was  to  change 
the perspective from individual (biological 
or social) agents to societal systems. These 
functional subsystems of not only society but 
also organizations operate “beside” those nu-
merous empirical subjects. Therefore, a step 
from individual cognitive actors (e.g. organ-
isms, living systems) to sub-systems of soci-
ety was pursued. Such a shift in perspective 
has influences on the concept of observation 
and on the concept of “environment” as well. 
Most of the phenomena Luhmann is inter-
ested in are on a second-order observation 
level.  Questions  within  such  a  perspective 
are about the consequences that arise when 
social systems organize observations within 
a certain framework (e.g., that of “morality” 
in Luhmann 2008). And it is an observer on 
a second-order level, then, that could ana-
lyze these consequences. In those cases, the 
interesting issues are the specific problems 
that arise because of the presence of other 
observing  systems  with  their  own  sugges-
tions for solutions to problems as well as for 
activities that hinder solutions. That seems 
to be the important step in a second-order 
perspective: to see what others could not see, 
and to analyze the restrictions found in such 
a situation.
« 4 »  There is a severe problem in in-
terpreting  Luhmann’s  approaches.  Before 
and after his “autopoietic turn” (somewhere 
around 1980), he used concepts and terms 
that  are  drawn  from  classical  cybernetics 
and seem to have ontological residues. Later 
on, a firm reorientation to second-order cy-
bernetics took place. However, his wording 
did not always look very different. There-
fore, one has to be extremely careful when 
relying on citations from Luhmann’s writ-
ings and has to consider explicitly the time 
of the publication of the text.
« 5 »  It  might  be  helpful  to  introduce 
another distinction: the distinction between 
a scientific observer and an observer with-
out scientific aspirations. In the latter case, 
the usual mode is to use simplifications and 
“acting ontologies”, mostly on a first-order 
observation level (Fuchs 2004 0.2.1). That 
seems to be exactly the level where commu-
nications about ecological crisis and sustain-
ability problems are located.
« 6 »  We have to mention a last point 
about  the  epistemology.  We  should  not 
forget  that  the  very  concept  “observation” 
shows a paradoxical basic structure (Luh-
mann 1992a). The above-mentioned simpli-
fications used in ecological communication 
are examples of a “de-paradoxication” (“Ent-
paradoxierung”) in order to be able to make 
decisions  and  take  responsibility  for  one’s 
own actions (Luhmann 1989: 10). It might 
be that the question raised in §80 could be 
answered when considering such simplifica-
tions.
« 7 »  The second set of remarks are about 
the use of the term “environment” in the con-
troversy on variants of constructivism and, 
especially,  on  sociological  systems  theory. 
The  authors  present  different  approaches, 
whose  subject  matter  range  from  physi-
cal facts to highly abstract epistemological 
schemes.  In  §49  the  authors  mention  that 
Luhmann also uses only the term “environ-
ment”  (without  an  index,  for  example)  to 
cover these different meanings – and identify 
this as a source of confusion. A lack of clarity 
is noted by the authors because there is no 
differentiation between the “inside perspec-
tive” and the “outside perspective.” Luhmann 
himself talked about the need to distinguish 
two concepts of “environment.” There is also 
an important distinction by Humberto Mat-
urana (1988), who talks about the general en-
vironment and the specific niche of systems.
« 8 »  That brings us to the central state-
ment about Luhmann’s conceptualization. In 
§81 the authors clearly explicate the follow-
ing: if society has – as a system only oper-
ating communications– no body, it has no 
(non-communicative)  environment  either. 
Are ecosystems, climate change, all today’s 
wicked environmental problems, then non-
existent  and  not  relevant  from  a  society’s 
viewpoint? 
« 9 »  But what, from such a perspective, 
are  “the  wicked  environmental  problems 
of society”? Those which are the content of 
communications taking place? And with the 
specification “wicked” is a specific distinc-
tion drawn or was a decision made to apply a 
specific reference framework? But by whom 
or by which system? on the basis of what 
distinction is the qualification as “wicked” 
justified? According to Horst Rittel’s defini-
tion of wicked problems (Rittel & Webber 
1973),  they  lack  a  clear  solution  strategy 
and change during their processing. That re-
fers, again, to the social part of the system/
environment relationship in contrast to the 
“material”  characteristics  of  environmental 
problems. With respect to §§86f, it would be 
helpful to add a reference to a second type 
of fundamental structure in social systems. 
Besides the code as the fundamental distinc-
tion criteria, there are various programs that 
organize the operations of the systems. They 
likewise  have  to  be  considered  (Luhmann 
1992b: 228ff) because of their relevance to 
the observation process.55
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« 10 »  In my opinion, a view on system/
environment relationships and on the rel-
evance of today’s ecological problems might 
benefit from a deeper view of the concept of 
structural couplings. From Luhmann’s writ-
ings on functional subsystems of society in 
the 1990s on, the term “structural coupling” 
became  a  more  and  more  prominent  ele-
ment of the social systems theory repertoire. 
« 11 »  Structural  couplings  represent 
connections that are taken for granted by 
both systems that interact in order to guar-
antee  a  mutual  preservation  of  existence. 
The concept was introduced to oppose the 
implication that systems merge together and 
build one united system. It also provides an 
alternative  to  interpreting  relationships  as 
causal relationships.
« 12 »  With  the  concept  of  structural 
couplings,  the  claimed  contradiction  be-
tween  the  autonomy  of  systems  and  the 
interrelationships with and dependency on 
other  systems  is  solved.  one  of  the  most 
convincing examples of structural couplings 
is the role of gravity in the ability of some 
organisms to move erect. In order to do so, 
some environmental conditions have to re-
main constant and, in this case, a structural 
coupling between organisms and their in-
organic environment is established (Krause 
2001: 162). 
« 13 »  An  example  relevant  to  sustain-
ability discourse is a hunger crisis. Undoubt-
edly, such a diagnosis of a crisis is socially 
constructed – yes, but not on all the levels 
of which the problem is constituted. on the 
organic level, there is a rather strict coupling 
between resources in the (physical) environ-
ment and the functioning of the organism. 
Malfunctions, due to a lack of support with 
necessary  foodstuff,  energy  for  preparing 
meals,  etc.,  cause  severe  function  deficits. 
Signals and irritations are sent to the asso-
ciated psychic systems and trigger thought 
processes  and  responses.  According  to 
Luhmann’s  suggestion,  then,  these  signals 
have to be inserted into the stream of com-
munications. only at that point, eventually, 
does society come into play. Thus, a com-
pletely different type of analysis is applied 
compared  with  former  theories,  e.g.,  that 
of Pitirim Sorokin (1975). No direct causal 
connections are accepted as lasting from en-
vironmental (ecological) conditions to soci-
etal responses. 
« 14 »  Such  distinctions,  as  introduced 
with  the  concept  of  structural  couplings, 
could contribute to a better understanding 
of the contributions and claims of construc-
tivist approaches. The environment is, from 
such  a  perspective,  structured.  According 
to Luhmann, the environment of a society 
consists  primarily  of  psychic  systems  be-
cause they provide material for the stream 
of communications. The observation at that 
level could rely on the concept of meaning 
on both sides. on other levels, different ob-
servation schemes are necessary. Therefore, 
we find on different levels (interconnected by 
structural couplings) different modes of ob-
servation. Not different in the pure operation 
mode (distinction and designation) but dif-
ferent in the selection of issues considered.
« 15 »  It has to be kept in mind that al-
though Luhmann is not interested in eco-
logical  facts,  simultaneously,  he  does  not 
deny the existence of those facts. There are, 
in his words, other levels of reality that are 
definitely a source of irritations – however, 
not on the level of the primary, existential 
operating mode, the autopoiesis, the system. 
“only in exceptional cases (i.e., on different 
levels of reality, irritated by environmental 
factors), can it… be set in motion.” (Luh-
mann 1989: 15). 
« 16 »  But  also  at  that  level,  circum-
stances can be imagined that lead to a de-
struction of the system, a breakdown of au-
topoiesis; that is, on the level of society, the 
extinction of the “participants” in the com-
munication process. 
« 17 »  The authors state very clearly the 
necessity to differentiate several meanings of 
environment and find different co-notations 
in  three  representative  constructivist  ap-
proaches.  A  direct  comparison  is  difficult 
because  of  the  diverging  epistemological 
frameworks that are utilized. What always 
has to be kept in mind is the point of refer-
ence, the reference system, laid down as the 
fundament from which the arguments are 
developed. The environment is, as a societal 
problem  (beside  others)  indeed  of  higher 
complexity than the designated system, re-
gardless  of  the  constructivist  relativisms 
and  of  the  observer  dependency.  Various 
irritations from different sources reach the 
system and the responses, if activated, are 
not arbitrary and random but part of agreed 
social practices.
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> upshot • We discuss the environmen-
tal terminology of Jakob von Uexküll in 
the context of Alrøe & Noe’s reflections, 
and to examine more deeply the multi-
perspectivity that arises from a combina-
tion of von Uexküll’s and Luhmann’s sys-
tems theories. The complexity yielded by 
an unpacking of the term “environment” 
sheds light on the difficulties in finding 
common  understandings  for  solving 
wicked problems.
Our perspective
« 1 »  In  general,  we  agree  with  Hugo 
Alrøe  and  Egon  Noe’s  far-reaching  reflec-
tions, which offer insights into the term “en-
vironment”  and  its  meaning  from  diverse 
perspectives.  Inspired  by  their  thoughts, 
we would like to offer further perspectives 
based on the following questions:
1  |  With  respect  to  Jakob  von  Uexküll’s 
diverse  terminology  on  environment: 
Can  other  environments  be  distin-
guished in Niklas Luhmann’s social sys-
tems theory?
2  |  With  respect  to  the  system/environ-
ment distinction: How malleable is this 
relationship  to  redefinition  and  inter-
pretation from multiple perspectives? E
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the meaning of different definitions 
of environment
« 2 »  Alrøe  and  Noe  introduce  von 
Uexküll’s  environmental  terminology. 
Synonymous  to  the  term  “Umwelt,”  von 
Uexküll  uses  “Wohnwelt,”  “self-world,” 
“Umgebung,”  (i.e.,  general  surroundings), 
“self-universe,”  and  others.  We  discuss 
those terms, from the closest to the “self” 
to that which we later define as the “un-
known”  environment.  In  analyzing  these 
terminologies  in  greater  detail,  it  is  ob-
vious  that  they  have  distinct  meanings. 
Therefore, our question is about the termi-
nologies’ specific definitions. In addition, 
we  ask  how  relevant  these  terminologies 
might be to Luhmann’s social systems the-
ory, which operates with only one term for 
environment, i.e., for that which is distinct 
from a system. 
« 3 »  The term “Wohnwelt” is described 
as a list of ecological factors existing in an 
animal’s system’s “Umgebung” and that are 
relevant  for  its  survival  (§51).  We  would 
argue that “Wohnwelt” describes the small-
est entity of the term “environment,” and 
includes those factors most relevant for an 
organism’s  individual  survival/existence, 
with a high potential for resonance effects 
or  structural  couplings.  The  autopoietic 
process of self-reproduction also includes 
input from this Wohnwelt. of course, it is 
the  system  itself,  through  its  operations, 
that decides what will be accepted from the 
environment (Wohnwelt in this case) in or-
der to reproduce the system. In Luhmann’s 
terms, the system determines meaningful 
structural couplings with the environment, 
which  is  the  very  narrow  surrounding 
called “Wohnwelt.” 
« 4 »  The  term  “self-world”  (§47), 
which von Uexküll alternatively applied to 
“phenomenal” worlds, offers us two options 
for interpretation. For Luhmann, “self” is 
the  difference  between  system  and  envi-
ronment, and is mainly explained through 
Maturana  &  Varela’s  concept  of  autopoi-
esis. The self also includes the environment 
because the “self” constructs the environ-
ment. Thus, the distinction between system 
and environment might be described as a 
fluid rather than as a “precise” distinction. 
All phenomena that resonate with a living 
organism are part of its meaningful world 
(§23), i.e., the “self world.”
« 5 »  Is  it  correct  to  say  that  the  self 
includes  the  environment?  According  to 
Luhmann,  the  system  constitutes  itself  by 
distinguishing  itself  from  its  environment 
(i.e., self-constitution of the system, cf. Luh-
mann 1995: 9, 443, 456). The environment 
is everything but the self, the remainder of 
everything  outside  the  system.  However, 
we argue differently: if I distinguish myself 
from something, I have to know the other 
consciously; and based on that I make the 
distinction. It is, therefore, in a certain sense 
– maybe temporarily – part of myself. 
« 6 »  According to Luhmann, the term 
“eigen” (self) refers to what is reproduced 
in  the  system.  “World”  in  combination 
with “eigen” implies something that we are 
able to survey, e.g., our personal/individual 
world (§48, see also §72: “the world is a limit 
case”). 
« 7 »   “Umgebung” is described as the 
immediate  environment.  For  an  animal 
(system) this might be its hunting ground, 
or from the perspective of a soil microor-
ganism (system) a soil aggregate. Accord-
ing to von Uexküll, the “self world” (§47) 
is what makes up the meaningful part of a 
system’s general surroundings (Umgebung) 
(§21). Thus, the term “Umgebung” is clearly 
related to “environment.” 
« 8 »   “Self-universe,” which is another 
concept that is used by von Uexküll to de-
scribe the term “Umwelt,” is a play on words. 
It  represents  some  kind  of  hybrid  under-
standing of “environment.” While the “self” 
refers to something limited, the “universe” 
expands the view to something endless, in-
terpreted as something that we are not able 
to gain an overview of, and is not known. It 
is impossible to distinguish between envi-
ronment and system if the environment is 
not known. This “knowing” could mean: the 
system knows that it does not know about 
the environment, the system does not know 
what it knows, or that the system does not 
know what it does not know (Bammer & 
Smithson 2008).
« 9 »  This  analysis  gives  evidence  for 
meaningful  distinctions  between  different 
types  of  environment.  This  could  open  a 
space for revising Luhmann’s proposed sys-
tem/environment  distinction  to  a  system/
environment/environment  distinction.  We 
offer  opportunities  to  construct  “environ-
ment,” described as at least three types: 
1  |  The first type of environment contrib-
utes to the meaning of the system and 
provides  knowledge  and  resources  to 
reproduce the system (see §15 in this ar-
ticle). This type of environment entails 
phenomena  that  are  conceivable  (psy-
chological) and communicable (social). 
We name this the system’s “factual (or 
constituting) environment.” 
2  |  The second type of environment is not 
relevant for the autopoietic process of 
the system at any given moment. There 
is neither communication nor structural 
coupling between system and environ-
ment. We name this the “potential (or 
stand-by position) environment.” Stand-
by position means that the environment 
already exists in the mind of a system, 
or – in a biological context – that there 
is something living or a consciousness, 
a “possibility space” for structural cou-
pling. 
3  |  The  third  type  of  environment  char-
acterizes  parts  of  the  universe.  These 
parts stand for an environment that is 
currently not known by a system. This 
does not exclude that it could one day 
become a potential or factual environ-
ment. From a system’s perspective, it is 
what we name the “unknown environ-
ment.” However, an observer is able to 
construct it.
« 10 »  With these three types of environ-
ments, we argue in favor of a flexible applica-
tion of the term “environment.” The system 
always constructs one of these environments 
when making the system/ environment dis-
tinction. A system is able to construct the 
first two types in parallel. The observer is 
able to construct all three environments. The 
three environment types can, but must not, 
occur  in  their  pure  form.  There  might  be 
time-space constellations leading to hybrids 
of  the  three  environment  types.  We  argue 
that constructs of different environments can 
exist, providing a meaning for the system. 
The  distinction  of  different  environments 
also  proposes  that  the  environment  con-
structed by the system differs from the ob-
server’s construction of the system’s environ-
ment. Interestingly, Luhmann only explains 
how the system reproduces itself and treats 
its environment as a black box. He argues: 
“it  (the  system)  perceives  its  environment 
only restrictedly and categorically distorted” Open Peer Commentaries  Bernhard Freyer & Rebecca louise Paxton
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(Luhmann 1986: 33; our translation; see also 
§68, “the system’s indifference to its environ-
ment” and “ignorance of the environment”). 
the dynamics of the system/
environment distinction
« 11 »  In  this  chapter,  we  examine  the 
system/environment  distinction  in  greater 
detail. We discuss the “chicken vs. egg” prob-
lem applied to system and environment, the 
observer’s  perspectives  on  system/environ-
ment  distinction,  internal  system  distinc-
tions, and the practical relevance of these dy-
namics when studying wicked problems.
« 12 »  What  Alrøe  and  Noe  highlight 
with the paradox of autopoiesis is that the 
living system “must distinguish itself from its 
environment while at the same time main-
taining its coupling, since it is the very en-
vironment  that  the  organism  arises  from” 
(§26).  Thus,  the  system  emerges  from  its 
environment and vice versa, and the living 
system is part of the environment in which 
it emerges. 
« 13 »  Quoting Varela’s “the exterioriza-
tion can only be understood… from the ‘in-
side’” (Varela 1991: 85), the environment is 
solely constructed by the system (§27). This 
precedes consciousness of the environment 
and communication with it. Does it follow 
that the environment becomes part of the 
system, and thus the environment as an in-
dependent unit disappears?
« 14 »  Luhmann (1995) follows this ar-
gumentation with reference to society as a 
whole. He defines society as the sum of all 
expectable  communications.  There  is  no 
communication outside the communication 
system of society. Society is a communica-
tively closed system. There is no communi-
cation with the environment because there 
is nobody who could answer. Thus, anyone 
giving an answer outside society becomes, 
by this, part of society (ibid: 402f.). He fur-
ther argues that society is a comprehensive 
system that does not necessarily have an en-
vironment (ibid: 408f.). 
« 15 »  Coming  back  to  societal  groups, 
Luhmann  describes  several  operations  in 
which  autopoietic  systems  and  environ-
ments  interrelate  without  the  immediate 
consequence that the environment becomes 
part of the system. In contrast to society, us-
ing these operations, the environment keeps 
its distinction from the system: 
1  |  The  system/environment  distinction 
describes  systems  as  environmentally 
open,  which  means  that  autopoietic 
systems are organizationally and opera-
tionally closed, while at the same time 
materially and energetically open (Luh-
mann 1982: 367). 
2  |  Resonance is “recursive – closed for re-
production and meanwhile open to irri-
tations by the environment” (Luhmann 
1986:  40;  our  translation).  Resonance 
between system and environment is a 
precondition for structural coupling.
3  |  Systems  interact  with  their  environ-
ment  through  diverse  types  of  struc-
tural  couplings.  There  is  no  loss  of 
system  independence.  The  structural 
couplings do not determine the status 
of the system. They merely supply the 
system  with  disturbances”  (Luhmann 
2002: 124).
4  |  Interpenetration  between  systems  de-
scribes that a system provides its own 
communication for the development of 
another  system.  Interpenetration  “ex-
ists  when  this  occurs  reciprocally  …” 
(Luhmann 1995: 213). Communication 
between  two  autopoietic  systems,  or 
evolutionary  developments,  demands 
interpenetration (ibid: 216). 
« 16 »  Cell division is a specific type of 
system/environment distinction (Maturana 
& Varela 1998). There could be three types 
of  system/environment  distinction.  First, 
two systems serve each other as their en-
vironment. Second, each system creates a 
new and individual environment, which is 
separate from the other system. Third, both 
systems construct the same environment.
« 17 »  What  Maturana  and  Varela  de-
scribe as the structural congruence between 
organism and environment (§29) is a char-
acteristic  that  can  also  be  found  in  sys-
tems e.g., agriculture. The agricultural sys-
tem could serve as the environment from 
which non-organic and organic agriculture 
emerge.  Agriculture  is  the  environment 
for  both  systems.  From  another  perspec-
tive, we could also argue that non-organic 
agriculture  is  the  environment  for  an  or-
ganic agriculture system, or vice versa. Both 
are autopoietic systems, able to reproduce 
themselves independently, and “can under-
go coupled structural changes” (cf. §31). If 
the agent defines its environment (§29), this 
also determines potential communications, 
or structural couplings. 
« 18 »  Communication  in  an  organic 
social  system  is  not  compatible  with  the 
non-organic  system  and  vice  versa.  In 
both  systems  one  will  encounter  different 
meanings and concepts of time and space, 
which might be the best explanation for the 
barrier  between  the  systems.  Luhmann’s 
perspective is very helpful for understand-
ing why organic agriculture is also seen as 
a social movement (cf. Hellmann 1996). It 
is a social system with limited significance 
in the system of big agro-business, because 
each follows its own binary code (in the or-
ganic system, e.g., ecology/non-ecology; in 
agro-business,  profit/loss  of  capital),  also 
described through their paradigms (Beus & 
Dunlap 1994).
« 19 »  The  inside-outside  distinction 
(§§58ff) is an example of the relevance of dif-
ferent observer perspectives in understand-
ing and interpreting wicked problems (§2). 
The system (an agent) itself constructs its 
own inside perspective, which is not directly 
observable by an observer. The observer is 
only able to re-construct the inner perspec-
tive of another agent through the interpre-
tation of what the observer perceives from 
the outside, e.g., countenance of a person. 
For the observer, the observed system be-
comes his (the observer’s) environment o1. 
The system (agent) itself then makes the dis-
tinction through its own construction of an 
environment s1. In a continuous feedback, 
the observer again observes the system as a 
new type of environment o2 that is different 
to what preceded it. The complex multi-per-
spectivity is increased by the observer’s own 
environment o3, which could partly overlap 
with that of the agent’s system. 
« 20 »  The observer’s construct of sys-
tem/environment  distinctions  of  another 
system is based on the autopoietic capacities 
of his own system and not those of the ob-
served person or system (cf. Luhmann 1984: 
25). Thus, the observer constructs different 
operations and interprets their meaning dif-
ferently than the observed. 
« 21 »  Systems  differentiation  is  “noth-
ing more than the repetition within systems 
of the difference between system and envi-
ronment “ (Luhmann 1995: 7), which means 
that  further  system/environment  distinc-
tions emerge in the system. This internal sys-E
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tem differentiation is described as a “process 
of increasing complexity” (ibid: 18), which 
is  an  autopoietic  process  of  reproduction. 
Reproduction “offers possibilities for form-
ing within the system a new system having 
its own system/environment difference …” 
(ibid: 258), which might survive longer than 
the former system.
« 22 »  Applying  different  lenses  to  de-
scribe  the  system/environment  distinction 
helps to understand complex systems and 
environments.  to  make  this  explicit,  we 
study  a  farming  system.  We  describe  the 
first distinction between the farming system 
– defined as a social system or a biological 
system  –  and  the  agricultural  industry  as 
the environment. In a farming system we 
define animals as a system (binary code: to 
live/to die), while environment is all kinds 
of fodder. of course animals (“non-rooted” 
organisms)  communicate  differently  than 
grasses  (meadows,  pastures)  (“rooted”  or-
ganisms) do. They do not depend on each 
other, they follow different genetically de-
fined communication procedures, and their 
reproduction is obviously different. Another 
distinction is that of a cow’s stomach (sys-
tem;  binary  code:  to  digest/not  to  digest) 
and  an  animal  (environment);  and  finally 
there is a distinction between the stomach 
(environment) and a microorganism com-
munity (system; binary code is to duplicate, 
to divide/not to duplicate). We neither argue 
that these distinctions are “part (system) of 
the whole (environment)” nor that they fol-
low a spatial concept. Both are perspectives 
of general systems theory, but not relevant 
for this commentary. What we provide are 
always  independent  system/environment 
distinctions.  All  named  systems  are  auto-
poietic, exist through internal functions and 
operations, and are self referentially closed; 
and in the sense of Luhmann they are social 
(communicating), and also biological (liv-
ing) systems. 
Conclusion
« 23 »  Regarding  our  first  question, 
there is huge potential to reflect upon and 
integrate  diverse  system/environment  dis-
tinctions. Von Uexküll’s terminology offers 
several ways to describe environments, but 
they are not precise enough as he was not 
aware of the issue of the observer’s construc-
tion of diverse system/environment distinc-
tions. With respect to our second question, 
we argue that his interest was mainly in sys-
tems, system/environment distinctions, and 
system/environment  interconnectedness, 
while  the  environment  itself  remained  a 
complex (§66) black box. Von Uexküll pro-
voked us to see various environments and 
reflect upon his perspective in the context of 
Luhmann’s system theory. Applying multi-
perspectivity  to  the  system/environment 
distinction  is  of  practical  relevance  when 
compromises between different system/en-
vironment realities are needed. In negotia-
tion processes, these insights could help to 
make  the  roots  of  contradictory  positions 
visible and to identify ways to better under-
stand alter ego arguments. of course there 
is the need to introduce the added value of 
these diverse constructs of environment in 
order to deal with wicked problems. 
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Environments, and the Body
Hugo F. Alrøe & Egon Noe
> upshot • In our response we focus on 
how different types of systems are relat-
ed from a constructivist perspective, and 
specifically on the relation between com-
municational social systems and embod-
ied agency.
Introduction
« 1 »  We are happy that our article “ob-
serving Environments” seems to have struck 
a chord that resonates with other research-
ers, and which has resulted in three open 
Peer  Commentaries  that  offer  extensions, 
complementary  notions,  and  further  per-
spectives. 
« 2 »  tom Ziemke is concerned with the 
construction of robotic systems that inter-
act with and adapt to their environments, 
focusing on the role of the body in situat-
ed and embodied cognition. In doing this, 
Ziemke finds little use for Niklas Luhmann’s 
work since Luhmann does not address in 
sufficient detail the relevance of the biologi-
cal level for a theory of meaning and there-
fore has little to say on embodied learning 
and adaptation.
« 3 »  Karl-Heinz  Simon  takes  an  op-
posite approach, focusing mainly on Luh-
mann,  even  when  discussing  organisms, 
and thereby resolving the claimed contra-
diction between autonomy and dependency 
of  systems  with  the  concept  of  structural 
couplings.
« 4 »  These  two  commentaries  thus 
choose to either disregard Luhmann’s work 
or  disregard  other  constructivist  theories. 
Thereby, they indirectly highlight the diffi-
culties that we investigated in our article in 
discussing the environment across different 
constructivist theories. 
« 5 »  Bernhard Freyer & Rebecca Louise 
Paxton on the other hand, tackle the prob-
lem  of  using  Luhmann’s  theory  together 
with other constructivist theories, though, 
not surprisingly, in a less specific manner. 
Freyer & Paxton work in a field similar to 
ours,  with  agriculture,  food,  health,  and 
wicked environmental problems. This calls 
for transdisciplinary research with multiple 
perspectives. Therefore they accept the ne-
cessity of working with different construc-
tivist theories across the biological and so-
cial level. 
« 6 »  together, the three commentaries 
suggest a need to look in more detail at how 59
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different  types  of  systems  are  related  and 
specifically  at  the  relation  between  social 
systems and embodied agency. 
types of systems and perspectives
« 7 »  According  to  Luhmann  (1995: 
2), there are systems of different kinds and 
at  different  levels.  He  distinguishes  four 
kinds of systems below the level of systems 
in general: social systems and psychic sys-
tems, which can be characterised by their 
use of meaning, and machines and organ-
isms, which do not use meaning. Ziemke 
disagrees with Luhmann on the relevance of 
meaning for organisms and machines, and 
says that the distinctions between machines 
and  organisms  are  becoming  still  more 
blurred due to developments in robotics and 
related areas. We agree, but a deeper ques-
tion is what we may mean by “system” in a 
constructivist sense. 
« 8 »  In  our  article  (§38),  we  discuss 
how Luhmann advises against other uses of 
“system” than a self-referential system that 
distinguishes itself from the environment - 
such as in the common use of “ecosystem” 
where ecological interdependencies are tak-
en to designate a “system” (e.g., Luhmann 
1989:  150).  We  appreciate  the  strength  of 
the self-defining systems concept. But this 
does not make us refrain from questioning 
the “ontological status” of the systems we 
speak of.
« 9 »  If we think about a farm as a sys-
tem, we insist that it is a self-organising sys-
tem (e.g., Noe & Alrøe 2006). But the farm 
is not merely a social system, or merely a 
biological  system.  A  farm  is  a  heteroge-
neous system that is biological, technologi-
cal, and sociological at the same time. What 
we mean by this is not that the farm is some 
kind  of  “ontological  hybrid”  of  different 
systems. What we mean is that a farm can 
be meaningfully observed from a range of 
specialised  perspectives,  including  social 
systems  theory.  “System”  is  a  perspectival 
concept.
« 10 »  Given  the  above,  the  farm  is  a 
social system, an organisation, in the sense 
that it can be described in terms of com-
munications and that it distinguishes itself 
from  its  environment.  The  farm  is  also  a 
physical system, in the sense that it can be 
observed from the perspective of physics, 
chemistry,  geology,  etc.,  and  be  described 
in terms of energy, material flows, chemical 
processes, mechanical structures, etc. Here, 
the  “system”  is  not  very  well  defined  and 
borders of the system have to be constructed 
from outside. The “farm as a physical sys-
tem” thus cannot compete with the “farm as 
social system” on Luhmann’s conditions for 
being a system.
« 11 »  But we may also say that the farm 
is an organism, or a cyborg, in the sense 
that it can be described in terms of adapta-
tion, senses, behaviour, etc., and that it has 
a body that matters. From this perspective, 
the  farm  is  a  self-organising  system  that 
maintains its own organisation and produc-
es (some of) its own components in terms 
of  recreating  soil  fertility,  breeding  stock 
animals, growing seeds for the next season, 
bringing up successors, reproducing knowl-
edge and practices, etc. (Noe & Alrøe 2006). 
This perspective on farms can be found in 
organic and, especially, biodynamic agricul-
ture (Paull 2006).
« 12 »  Farms are different and different 
perspectives may not be equally fitting or 
fruitful for all farms. For some farms, such 
as a modern Danish pig farm enterprise that 
relies on a host of externally produced in-
puts and that has several employees, a man-
agement board, a wide range of advisors and 
suppliers  that  enter  into  farm  operations, 
couplings to legal, economic and scientific 
systems,  etc.,  the  “farm  as  social  system” 
perspective can be very fruitful for under-
standing how the farm works, and the “farm 
as organism” perspective less so. For other 
farms, such as a traditional subsistence farm 
that relies entirely on internally produced 
inputs and that has only the family working 
on it and no advisors or suppliers, it may be 
the other way around. But in neither case 
will  one  perspective  be  sufficient  for  un-
derstanding the empirical dynamics of the 
system.
Communicational systems 
and embodied cognition
« 13 »  The farming system is just an ex-
ample to indicate the issue we are trying to 
explicate. We need to talk about complex 
dynamical objects, such as “a farm,” but we 
only have the immediate objects of differ-
ent specialised perspectives at our disposal, 
such as “the farm as social system” and “the 
farm as organism” (cf. Alrøe & Noe 2011). 
Luhmann’s social systems theory is not ex-
empt from being a specialised perspective, 
even though it is “universal” in the sense 
that it is able to observe itself as a social sys-
tem. 
« 14 »  Ziemke stated that in the case of 
embodied cognition and learning in robot-
ics,  Luhmann’s  social  systems  perspective 
does not have much to offer. Perhaps an-
other example can illustrate the issue more 
directly. A scientific perspective, such as a 
specialised discipline like soil physics, can 
be  observed  as  both  a  communicational 
and a cognitive system. As a social system, 
it establishes its own communicational or-
ganisation in the form of conferences, jour-
nals, peer review systems, email discussion 
lists,  web  pages,  diagrammatic  tools,  etc. 
As a cognitive system, it creates its own or-
ganisation  by  establishing  observation  in-
struments, experimental facilities, research 
platforms,  indicator  systems,  interactive 
models, computing equipment, etc. Embod-
ied learning is an important aspect of sci-
ence as a cognitive system, but not visible in 
science as a communicational social system. 
« 15 »  The same things can be said of a 
society. Society can be observed both as a 
social system that creates its own commu-
nication structures, and as an organism, or 
cyborg, that creates its own organization in 
terms of, e.g., transport infrastructures, cit-
ies, communication technologies, food and 
energy production. These different perspec-
tives will enable us to observe different as-
pects of “society” as a dynamical object, and 
each have their blind spots. Aspects such as 
embodied cognition, learning and adapta-
tion, embodied agency, sensorimotor skills, 
Merkwelt  and  Wirkwelt,  monitoring  sys-
tems, etc. may prove equally important to 
communication, functional differentiation, 
and  structural  coupling  when  addressing 
wicked environmental problems of modern 
societies.
Dependency of systems on their 
environment
« 16 »  Is  human  society  dependent  on 
its environment or is it independent of the 
environment?  Freyer  and  Paxton  (§12ff) 
discuss this question in their commentary. 
The question is pressing when we talk about 
wicked environmental problems, and when 
ecological  economy  speaks  of  the  depen-E
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dency of society on ecosystems and plan-
etary boundaries for human influence. 
« 17 »  According  to  Simon  (§§10–14), 
referring to Luhmann’s writings, there are no 
direct causal connections leading from envi-
ronmental conditions to societal responses. 
Instead the relationship is described in the 
form of structural couplings. 
« 18 »  However, the environment of so-
ciety consists primarily of psychic systems, 
and Luhmann does not have much to say on 
the relation between a psychic system and 
the organism or body, nor on the relation to 
machines or technology. It is not clear how 
resonance and irritation can take place be-
tween different types of system. Therefore 
the dependency of society on the environ-
ment through structural couplings is, from 
an analytical viewpoint, rather indirect and 
unclear. Things such as feeling, value and 
empathy, which are important for taking ac-
tion  against  environmental  problems,  can 
easily get lost through the series of structur-
al couplings that link social communication 
and the body. 
Conclusion
« 19 »  The  cases  of  farming  systems, 
scientific  disciplines,  and  embodied  cog-
nition  in  robotics  challenge  Luhmann’s 
simple and rather conventional typology of 
systems. This is not the place to take up this 
challenge, but the commentaries encourage 
us to reiterate the recommendation in the 
target  article.  Luhmann’s  theory  of  com-
municational  social  systems  is  a  helpful 
perspective on the wicked environmental 
problems of society, and we need to con-
sider how best to apply the theory in con-
junction  with  other  perspectives  such  as 
the embodied learning perspective on soci-
ety as an organism.
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